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Abstract 
 
In China, the past 30 years have been characterized by economic growth and rapid 
development that has transformed the nation into an important player on the international 
market. This phenomenal progress probably would have been impossible without the cheap 
labor force provided by the Chinese countryside in the form of migrant workers. Millions of 
rural people circulate the nation today in order to find jobs and earn money. The 
underdeveloped countryside cannot provide the incomes needed to support the giant rural 
population, and the Chinese nation is highly segregated when it comes to wages, social 
services and welfare benefits, access to education and employment. This thesis argues that 
these unequal conditions to a great extent are affected by the hukou (household registration) 
system, which registers all citizens as rural or urban, agricultural or non-agricultural. Within 
this system, all civil social rights are tied to the place of registration and the urban citizens 
have for a long time been privileged over the rural ones. In this way, the Chinese state has 
created a highly unequal society in which people are categorized and divided based on their 
geographical location. The thesis focuses on the hukou system as a single case study of an 
extreme case of state control over population movement, with particular emphasis put on the 
migrant workers in urban areas and the effects that the hukou system has on their lives and on 
the society in general. Migration theory, migration in relation to development and the state, 
migration patterns in China, causes for migration and the development and effects of the 
hukou system will be discussed in this study.  
Keywords: hukou, China, migration, migrant worker, the state. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem formulation – A Conflict of Interest 
 
In the land of China, with a population of 1.3 billion people, the state tries desperately to keep 
track of its giant population. The main tool it has at its disposal is the so called hukou system, 
a registration system with the aim of monitoring, controlling and at times stopping the 
movement of the population. Domestic migration in contemporary China is one of the greatest 
mass movements seen in history. Every year, hundreds of millions of people circulate 
between the villages, towns and cities of China. Most of them are looking for employment, 
even though there are other important factors contributing to the decision to migrate. The 
migration is not problem-free, however, as it is largely controlled by the government, mainly 
through the hukou system. The hukou (household or residential registration) system is a 
unique institutional arrangement aimed at closely controlling population movement, but with 
the additional function of making sure that the great surplus of laborers in China is used in a 
way that benefits urban development. Under the Chinese hukou system, all citizens must be 
registered, and every change of residency and location is closely monitored. Like all 
bureaucratic control systems, the hukou system ultimately affects the people whose lives 
somehow are determined by it. In China it is the migrants, and their families who often have 
invested a lot in their journey to the cities, whose lives are largely affected by the framework 
of the system, in ways that will be further discussed in this thesis. Born in the rural 
countryside, they are to a great extent tied to the land, and the ones who move to the cities are 
constantly reminded of their rural past, and are in a way “second class citizens” in their own 
country. The hukou system limits their opportunities, and has done so for a long time – 
migrants are deprived of their right to social benefits and often can only get the most low-
paid, dirty and often dangerous jobs. The Chinese government, on the other hand, has been 
and still is forced to find solutions to the problem of controlling its gigantic population of 1,3 
billion people. Faced with the task of monitoring and keeping control of the movement of the 
largest population in the world, the government seems to believe that it has to somehow 
reduce the internal migration and the hukou system has apparently been considered the best 
way of doing this. China‟s extremely rapid urban development during the past thirty years 
would have been impossible without the big group of migrant workers moving into the cities. 
They constitute the never-ending source of cheap labor available to employers at factories and 
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other places of work in the Chinese metropolises. The hukou system restrains the migrants‟ 
rights to social benefits, such as insurance, health care or subsidized housing, in the cities. At 
the same time the system allows the leadership to keep control over the great population and 
avoid a possible mass movement into the already rapidly growing cities of Guangzhou, 
Shanghai, Beijing etc. There is, thus, an apparent conflict of interest presiding here. The state 
sees to its best interests and tries to build the Chinese (urban) economy and industrialization, 
while the migrants naturally wants to have a piece of the success that is China today, and to 
which they have contributed so much. In this thesis, I have mainly focused on the migrants‟ 
side of the conflict, investigating their interests and the ways they are discriminated through 
the hukou system. The perspective of the Chinese state is surely interesting as well, but much 
too big of a topic to be further explored here.  
 
1.2 Aim of the study 
 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate three things; 1) how the hukou system in China 
functions and has developed, 2) how patterns of migration are constituted in China and 3) 
what the effects of the hukou system are. I am particularly interested in the hukou system‟s 
discriminating effects, i.e. how some people are privileged and others disadvantaged 
depending on where they were born. Even though it naturally is not the only determining 
factor, the geographical location plays an important role in deciding the life opportunities for 
individuals in China. I want to illustrate this by putting particular emphasis on the migrants in 
China; look into how internal labor migration is constituted in China, investigate what factors 
are important when decisions about migration are being made, and how the hukou system 
affects society and individuals‟ lives in China. The emphasis concerning the latter will be 
especially put on the way the hukou system has created and still is reestablishing a dualistic 
society and economy which means that regional gaps are big and that people have different 
opportunities depending on where they are located. Income gaps, unevenly distributed state 
investments, access to welfare benefits and education, and a segmented labor market are being 
investigated. With the help of migration theory, as well as the perspective of migration in 
relation to development and the state, I wish to illustrate how migration has been viewed since 
the founding of the PRC (People‟s Republic of China) and how migration and development 
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actually can benefit from each other. Another aim of this thesis is to look at the research done 
in this field, and to see if there is any important topic missing in the existing literature 
concerning the hukou system, the “floating population” in China and the ways the state is 
controlling development and migration.  
The hukou system is an interesting contemporary phenomenon, especially when put in the 
context of development and state control over its population. I perceive the hukou system as, 
on one level, an efficient form of registration and population movement monitoring and as, at 
another level, an extreme case of state control. The most intriguing aspect of the system is, in 
my view, that it so completely can be used to determine where people should live and which 
rights they should be entitled to – things that for most people living in countries with less 
rigid registration systems, seem completely absurd. Instead of all national citizens being equal 
and have the same basic rights, in China the great majority of the population is to a certain 
degree excluded in societal life and do not have the same opportunities as the more privileged 
part of the population. The state can completely decide over its population‟s whereabouts, and 
uses the powerful hukou system to do it. Furthermore, the hukou system is an important 
political tool as well, providing the CCP (China‟s Communist Party) with an excellent 
instrument for reassuring that the political power stays with the CCP elite, the urban 
population. Extremely few people of the rural population are members of the party, and the 
great majority of the party members hold urban hukou. Unlike other registration systems, the 
hukou system is a way for the state to impose exclusion on certain people and to treat people 
differently depending on their category for registration. I also find the hukou system to be 
interesting since it is influenced by, and given authority from, so many sources:  
the PRC hukou system draws its extraordinary institutional legitimacy, operational 
effectiveness, and cultural support not only from the power of an authoritarian state but 
also from the Chinese family or clan structure, regional and community divisions, the 
tradition of parochial political structure, and the fact that a hukou system existed in China 
for a very long time before the PRC came into being (Wang 2005: 24). 
Hence, the hukou system in its current form has a long history and is legitimized through a 
pool of different practices and traditions in China. This thesis argues that the hukou system 
causes a great deal of hardship for a big part of the population even though it has proven 
effective in order for the state to practice control over the mobility of the population. I will 
show that the system is highly complex and multifaceted and functions as the state‟s main tool 
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for controlling population movement. It is an odd and unusual system and its complexity is 
associated with the dualistic society existing in China today. I will discuss a variety of effects 
of the hukou system on people‟s life strategies as well as on greater societal structures. I will 
mainly, with my starting point in the model constructed below, focus on the Chinese hukou 
system as a bureaucratic institutional framework and describe how people behave given the 
constraints of this framework.  
 
1.3 Research Question  
 
As stated above, population movement in China is today characterized by its massive 
migration flows from rural to urban areas and the state‟s efforts to control these. This thesis 
explores the relation between individual migration strategies and state policy by using the 
example of Chinese mass migration and the influential hukou system. Hence, the main 
questions that I intend to answer in this thesis are as follow: 
How does the state migration control system affect individual life strategies? What are the 
effects of the system on the Chinese society as a whole? This thesis argues that the hukou 
system generates contradictory effects, being both a means of integrating city and countryside 
and as a source of conflict between city and countryside.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into a number of chapters, each of which discusses different topics 
related to the hukou system and the Chinese context. In chapter 2, I deal with the theoretical 
framework of the thesis. I begin by giving a brief introduction to the main ideas within 
migration theory, with a special focus on the ways migration has been theorized within 
anthropology. This has a somewhat historical focus to it, as I describe the development of 
migration theory. I then move on to discussing migration and its relationship with 
development and the state. I discuss what kinds of effects migration can have on the 
development of a nation, i.e. whether migration is positive or negative for development. 
Different standpoints are being discussed, and I talk about these matters in general and on a 
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more abstract level, before moving on to discussing the Chinese context. The role of the state 
is also brought up to discussion, as I try to understand how the state can impose its policies 
and strategies on migration in order to boost development in the desired direction. I conclude 
that there is still a lot of research to be done concerning the relationship between internal 
migration and the state. After this, the example of China is being investigated briefly, in order 
to give the reader a better understanding of the context within which the hukou system 
operates. In chapter 3, the general framework of the thesis is put forward, together with a 
model intending to illustrate how the Chinese state‟s use of the hukou system and the creation 
of a dualistic society with a segregated economy and poor integration between the rural and 
the urban areas, has largely affected the large flows of migrants circulating China today. In 
chapter 4, the method of the thesis is presented. The case study method is being discussed and 
the strengths and weaknesses of it are being weighed against each other in order to show the 
qualities and limitations of the use of this method. A short presentation of the types of 
material used in this thesis is offered as well. In chapter 5, I have put the emphasis on the 
people most affected by their hukou status – the migrants. The migrant laborers are an 
interesting and fascinating group in the Chinese society and their lives are indeed influenced 
by the hukou system. I present how population movement has developed in China during the 
PRC and how growing regional gaps have preserved the cities‟ privilege over the countryside. 
Thereafter, I want to investigate why the rural people in the Chinese countryside move, i.e. 
what the most important reasons for migration are. I discuss migration caused by economic 
factors, social- and kinship networks, and marriage migration. Chapter 6 begins with a 
description of the development of the hukou system, its origins and progress from 1949 till 
today. The purpose of the chapter is to give the reader a presentation of the system and the 
background information needed to fully understand the discussion about the hukou system in 
the thesis. In chapter 7, the effects of the hukou system are the main theme. I look at the 
hukou system as a political tool, and then go on to demonstrate how the hukou system affects 
such matters as income, access to welfare benefits and social services, education and the labor 
market. Thereafter, in chapter 8, I discuss the matters taken up in the thesis on a more in depth 
level, trying to give the reader a summary of what has already been said and concluding how 
the hukou system is related to the state, migration and development. I try to refer back to the 
matters brought up earlier in the thesis and to tie up the ends. After this, the references are 
listed in chapter 9. 
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2. The Study of Migration and Development 
2.1 Migration Theory 
 
The story of the so called floating population in China is not new, nor unique. There have 
always been people moving from the countryside to the cities and back again, around the 
world and over the centuries. They have gone through hardships and often been transformed 
into outsiders, not completely integrated in their new place of residence, upon arrival in their 
place of destination. Whatever the cause of migration, identities have been recreated and 
people have had to find their new place in the world. In the modern society, the construction 
of “we” and “them” is constantly recreated, as boundaries change and new people are 
included or excluded (Eriksen 2004). And migration has traditionally been especially 
sensitive when it comes to inclusion and exclusion, identity creation and the “we versus them” 
dichotomy. Writes Solinger; “…migration throws up a specter of an overwhelmed state, of 
assaulted citizenry, and of rampant social turmoil: the vision of the optimist…seems to many 
to be just a mirage” (Solinger 1999: 3). That migration is controversial in many cases is 
obvious. Whether it is fellow countrymen moving into the cities from the countryside, or 
foreigners crossing the border, migration is a constant subject for discussion - among 
researchers, migrants themselves, the original population already dwelling in the places of 
destination and within governments.  Within anthropology, migration is a relatively new focus 
of study. In the 1950‟s and 1960‟s, migration started to be given attention by anthropologists 
as ideas of static culture and strict territorialism were abandoned. As cities began to fill with 
rural migrants in traditional areas for anthropological fieldwork, the subject began to be fully 
explored (Brettell 2000: 97). When theorizing about migration, anthropologists have focused 
“less on the broad scope of migration flows than on the articulation between the place whence 
a migrant originates and the place or places to which he or she goes. This includes exploration 
of how people in local places respond to global processes” (ibid: 98). The micro level of 
analysis and theorizing is a traditional method for the field of anthropology, in which the 
interest for individuals, the household or groups is the most important. Within migration 
theory, Nancie Gonzalez (1961) has created a typology that, according to Brettell, has been 
frequently used by anthropologists. It is a typology listing the following five types of 
migratory wage labor: “seasonal migration”, “temporary, nonseasonal migration”, “recurrent 
migration”, “continuous migration” and “permanent removal” (Gonzalez 1961: 1265). The 
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second type of migration, temporary migration, is the type of migration discussed in this 
thesis. In Gonzalez‟s typology, these migrants usually move alone and do not bring their 
families to the destination. The typical migrant is young and unmarried. According to 
Gonzalez, these young migrants move because they want to see the world and earn money to 
buy high status items to gain prestige at home. Temporary migration is an effective way of 
integrating surplus labor: “[a]nother avenue for draining off a labor surplus is temporary, 
nonseasonal migration. If this labor surplus is channeled into activities which increase the 
flow of wealth into the society, the general standard of living will probably increase, even 
though the economic base remains the same” (ibid. 1266). The migrant will partly support the 
family back home, and will experience a period of great adventure and meet a lot of new and 
exciting people, according to Gonzalez. This kind of migration usually leads to an imbalance 
between the sexes, meaning that there is often a surplus of unmarried women in the places of 
origin since so many young men migrate. While the Chinese labor migrant might not fit 
perfectly into this category, I do find a few characteristics that they have in common. That this 
kind of migration provides an extra source of income and that it brings new ideas back to the 
home village or town is true for China‟s temporary migration, whereas the predicted 
imbalance in the sex ratio cannot be completely true since so many Chinese women migrate 
as well. Gonzalez‟s typology gives us an idea of how earlier anthropologists dealt with the 
study of migration. The categories identified by her, can be important when discussing the 
hukou system as well. The typologies give us an idea of the type of migration which is most 
common in China today, of why and how people called temporary, non-seasonal migrants 
move around.  
In migration theory, there is usually a distinction made between “push” and “pull” factors, 
which need to be taken into account when discussing motivations for migration. The push 
factors are those “life situations that give one reason to be dissatisfied with one‟s present 
locale”, while the pull factors “are those attributes of distant places that make them appear 
appealing” (Dorigo and Tobler 1983:1). Push factors can, for instance, be economic 
insufficiency, limited access to resources, or lack of a social network. Pull factors can also be 
economic ones – the opportunity to earn money might be bigger in the place of destination. 
Other pull factors could be the wish to join a family member or the desire to explore life in the 
city. The so called modernization theory within migration research, stresses the economic 
push and pull factors as replies to differences in wages, resources and labor in the place of 
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origin and the place of destination. Wage labor is viewed as offering more opportunities than 
agricultural work and can provide the capital needed to survive in the countryside. The “bright 
lights” theory on the other hand, has emphasized the excitement of city life which draws 
young migrants to the urban areas and wage labor. The modernization theory assumes that 
“the movement of people from areas that had abundant labor but scarce capital to areas that 
were rich in capital but short of labor would ultimately contribute to economic development 
in both sending and host societies” (Brettell 2000: 102-103). In the view of the modernization 
theorists, a more equal balance of capital and labor, resources and population pressure would 
eventually be created, which would lead to the definitive elimination of differences between 
urban and rural areas. Migrants would, through saving and investing money, be the ones 
bringing change to their rural homes. As Brettell points out, however, this vision has not 
always come true. On the contrary, the money earned by the migrants is often spent on 
consumer goods and the skills learned at the place of destination cannot always be easily 
transferred to the native area. In the end, instead of migration creating prosperous and self-
dependent towns and villages in the countryside, these places become migrant-dependent and 
population movement has resulted in several generations of migrants (ibid). The 
modernization model‟s push and pull factors still prevail in current migration research, but the 
linear development it assumes has to be reconsidered. The push and pull factors often work 
simultaneously, and it can be hard to completely separate them from each other.  
 
2.2 Migration, Development and the State 
 
Migration, and especially international migration, is often viewed by scholars as a net 
advantage to development in the place of migrants‟ origin because of money sent home by 
migrants. Remittances are circulated from the richer places of the world which often are 
places of destination for migrants, to the developing parts of the world which are the places of 
origin. The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) states on its website that remittances are the most 
concrete connection between migration and development, and that in 2006 the official flow on 
money totaled over US $ 280 billion worldwide (Migration Policy Institute). Internal rural-
urban migration has also been seen as a desirable process in which “surplus labor was 
withdrawn from traditional agriculture to provide cheap manpower to fuel a growing modern 
industrial complex” (Todaro 1987: 361). The historical-structuralist approach within 
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migration theory, for example, views migration as a part of “a global economy, core-
periphery relations, and the development of underdevelopment” (Brattell 2000: 103). 
According to this approach, development encourages migration, rather than stemming it, since 
“development creates inequality and raises awareness about the larger society and hence 
enhances a sense of relative deprivation. The net economic value of migration accrued to the 
city and not the countryside, to the core and not the periphery” (ibid). Here, the global market 
is the focus as well as the way capitalist development has generated specific migration 
streams through disrupting, displacing or attracting local populations.  
Migration can, however, also bring with it negative effects. For instance, rural-urban 
migration has been given attention as a contributor to the increasing urban unemployment. 
Population movement into urban areas can be a source of “chronic and rising urban surplus 
labor” as the cities cannot find employment for the growing urban population (Todaro 1987: 
362). Migration is thus very ambiguous and its relationship to the development of the nation 
is not clear-cut. Farrant et.al. (2006: 386) give a few examples of possible positive 
development effects of migration, including increased global economic efficiency, new 
opportunities for the migrating individual, inflow of remittances, reduced unemployment in 
sending area, increasing trade flows, stimulation of investment in education and individual 
human capital. The possible negative effects includes loss of skilled workers which also could 
lead to reduced growth and productivity, lower return from public investments in public 
education and selective migration leading to increasing income disparities and the creation of 
a society dependent on remittances.  
Deshingkar and Grimm, in their contribution to the International Organization for Migration‟s 
(IOM) book published in time for the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development in September 2006, believe that internal migration “can play an 
important role in poverty reduction and [that] it should not be controlled…By underplaying or 
ignoring the vast contribution that migrant labour makes to the economy, governments escape 
the responsibility of providing them with adequate living conditions, minimum wages and 
freedom from exploitation and harassment” (2006: 50). They state that out of all types of 
internal migration, the rural-urban one is the one most likely to boost development. One 
reason for this is that wages often are higher in the cities than in the countryside, and another 
is that work in the cities usually comes along more regularly than agricultural work that is 
dependent on the crop seasons. Deshingkar and Grimm worry about the fact that many 
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national leaders still have not acknowledged rural-urban migration as an effective way out of 
poverty and toward economic development, and that they try to hinder this activity through 
population movement control and limitations on informal sector activities (ibid. 57). Studies 
from around the world show that migration actually has highly positive impacts on poverty 
reduction and economic development, according to Deshingkar and Grimm. Referring to a 
range of studies, they say that migration has significantly positive effects on people‟s lives 
and well-being and that restriction on population movement can turn out to be 
counterproductive. Even though there is no official data for the economic contribution of 
labor migration, the estimates are that it plays a significant role in boosting economic growth. 
In India, for example, an estimate is that 90 percent of all workers within construction are 
labor migrants. Furthermore, “[w]ithout migrant labour, timely transplanting and harvesting 
would not be possible in many parts of South Asia, especially where land parcels are too 
small to mechanize. Many industries geared towards export use migrant labour: prawn 
processing and garment manufacturing are but two” (ibid. 84). Policymakers and national 
leaders throughout the globe have tended to see migration mainly as a problem that is 
threatening social and economic stability. Many policymakers have therefore tried to control 
and regulate internal migration. In Africa, control of population mobility is an implicit part of 
many agricultural and rural development policies. Apartheid South Africa, with its “pass 
laws” hindering the non-white part of the population from migrating and moving outside of 
their birthplaces, was the most outright policy to prohibit migration. This policy was removed 
in the 1980‟s, but around Africa today there still are many countries trying to limit migration 
and urbanization. Special permits, fees, fines, roadblocks and harassments are ways of 
preventing migration throughout the African continent. In India, the view of migration is also 
negative, but here the approach toward regulation is a bit different. Here rural development 
programs aim to reduce migration by creating employment opportunities and regenerate 
resources in the countryside (Deshingkar and Grimm 2006: 87).  
As we can see, the relationship between development and migration is highly dependent on 
the role of the state. The state is a key player in a country‟s economic development, and the 
way the leadership handles migration can have significant effects on the reduction of poverty 
and resource allocation. Through policies of development programs, punishment 
arrangements and benefit measures the state can control the movement of its population and 
choose how to deal with questions concerning urban overpopulation, rural underdevelopment, 
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economic progress and urban-rural integration. However, within migration theory, the role of 
the state has not been particularly emphasized or researched. According to Fan (2008: 2), the 
theories concerned with international migration is to a much larger extent interested in the 
state, laws, policies and legislatives than those concerned with domestic migration. There is, 
hence, a need for domestic migration theory to further explore the role of the state and state 
institutions in relation to development. This is especially important when we look at formerly 
socialist transitional economies. It is in these economies that the state plays the most 
prominent role and where the state has gone through the biggest changes. Russia and China 
are two such economies, where the state still plays a crucial role in shaping of the society 
(ibid. 3). The role of the Chinese state in the country‟s development and migration control 
will be discussed further below.  
 
2.3 Migration and Development in China 
 
The past 30 years have been crucial in the development of the Chinese nation. The new 
approach of opening-up and economic reform have dramatically transformed China from a 
rather backwards, isolated and poor country into a modern market economy known to the rest 
of the world,  in which millions of people have been lifted out of poverty. Migration in China 
has been highly restricted for a long time, but in the 1980‟s when the laws regulating it were 
loosened, large-scale migration started instantly. Today millions of people migrate each year, 
most of whom are looking for employment. Labor migration is one of the most important 
features of the success of the Chinese economy today. The GDP has grown at an estimated 
rate of 10 percent annually during the past few years, and the migrants have certainly 
contributed to this. These low-skilled and cheap laborers are hard working, many in number  
and easy to employ, making them attractive to not only domestic employers, but to foreign 
investors as well. There is also evidence showing that internal migration in China has affected 
the development of the countryside, through remittances and the accumulation of skills and 
knowledge brought back home to the places of origin. Still, migration and rural development 
has to a large extent been affected and restricted by strategies initiated by the state, such as the 
hukou system. 
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The state in China plays an important role in restricting migration and controlling population 
movement. The adoption of market economy has not diminished the state‟s role as the 
“ultimate planner that guides and regulates the economy” (Fan 2008: 3). The CCP dominates 
the state and lays the foundation for all economic planning in China. The definition of the 
Chinese state is broad. Not only is the central government included here, but also local 
governments and agencies and institutions that are “authorized for planning purposes”. Since 
the late 1970‟s the Chinese state has left the Maoist idea of central planning and has taken 
several steps toward a developmentalist agenda. The political ideology has today a secondary 
role and instead the economic development and policies such as marketization, 
decollectivization and fiscal decentralization are top priorities for the state (ibid). Policies 
emphasizing agriculture have given place to industry- and service oriented policies that focus 
on modernization. The state‟s approach toward labor has changed as well. In Maoist times, 
the state took care of the employment of school graduates, job transfers and collective 
agricultural work. Job mobility was low and the state completely controlled labor migration. 
The hukou system prevented rural-urban labor migration and by tying the rural work force to 
the countryside, the state could guarantee that the urban areas received the necessary 
quantities of low-prized agricultural products. In the cities, the state initiated industrialization 
based on mainly heavy-industry after the Soviet development model. Thus, “the state erected 
barriers between the city and the countryside in order to advance a specific model of 
development” (Fan 2008: 4). In this way, the state in China has created a society in which 
peasants are second-class citizens and where the urban population is privileged in all spheres. 
By allowing people to be temporary migrants, the state makes sure that the urban industries 
have the necessary flow of cheap work force needed for its developmentalist model while, at 
the same time, ensuring that the migrants return back home after a certain time without 
burdening the state (ibid). Fan calls this approach the state‟s migrant labor regime, saying that 
the peasants‟ institutional and social inferiority and the extreme rural labor surplus are the 
main aspects explaining the peasants‟ pursuit of urban employment despite the low salaries. 
“Without social insurance and labor rights infrastructure, the migrant labor regime is a safe 
haven for urban and industrial employers that thrive on cost-minimization and exploitation” 
(ibid. 5). According to Fan, the state is the key factor distinguishing China from other 
developing nations holding large numbers of unskilled labor used in labor-intensive 
industrialization. She argues that the Chinese state is actively channeling and constraining 
migrant workers to specific sectors and jobs – the low-waged, dirty and sometimes dangerous 
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jobs at construction sites, in factories and the like. Writes Fan (2008: 5): “Temporary migrants 
in Chinese cities are not spillovers from the primary sector; rather, they are blocked by the 
state institutions from entering the primary sector. The migrant labor regime is, in essence, the 
product of a system that defines opportunities by hukou status and locality and that fosters a 
deep divide between rural and urban Chinese”.  
The state‟s interests play important roles when policies are being made concerning the 
population‟s movement and opportunities. The state, eager to keep the ancient concept of 
harmony within society while still provide the industry with the cheapest possible labor force, 
is in conflict with the interests of the migrants. They are hungry for fortune, money and 
education – something that should be available independent of place of birth. In order to 
become one of the most successful economies in the world, China has produced an incredible 
pool of cheap labor, seemingly without paying much attention to the interests of the people. 
With the countryside being underdeveloped and not very prosperous, people are forced to 
move into the cities to look for employment. Here, we find a true contradiction between the 
benefit of the state and the rural population turned migrants. It is in the interest of the state to 
keep the large labor source available to the urban industries, which means that they in a way 
benefit from keeping the countryside underdeveloped and the jobs there limited and low-paid. 
However, in order to keep the cities stable and under control, the state also limits the 
migrants‟ opportunities and wellbeing in the cities. By not granting social benefits and other 
profits to this group of people dwelling in the cities, they ensure that the urban areas do not 
become overpopulated and that the urban elite can continue being the most privileged group 
in China. This is, of course, in strong contradiction to the migrants‟ interests. The rural 
population has a limited access to state resources such as job opportunities, higher education 
and housing, and many are forced to become migrants in order to support themselves. They 
move to the cities in hopes of better job opportunities and most of them are employed as 
cheap unskilled labor, making more money than in the countryside but at the same time facing 
discrimination and marginalization in the cities. In the words of Fan (2008: 105):  
The migrant labor regime is one that is grounded on maximization of productivity by 
extracting as much labor as possible from migrant workers…This demand-side 
explanation is exhibited through labor market practices that are discriminatory and 
exploitative…At the same time, peasant migrants‟ main objective of monetary gain and 
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their plan to eventually return to the countryside mean that job tenure, loyalty, and career 
development are of little importance.  
 
The household registration system is an old system, aimed at keeping the people under control 
by regulating their movement and carefully monitoring their registration. In short, the hukou 
system in its current form was initiated shortly after the communists came to power in China, 
1949. In China, people have their social benefits, such as health care, insurance, pensions, 
subsidized housing and education, tied to their place of registration. If you were born in the 
countryside, that is where your social rights are located. The urban areas have traditionally 
been privileged over the countryside – in terms of development, employment, resources, and 
life opportunities. The hukou functions as a kind of passport, and it is extremely hard for a 
regular rural person to change his or her hukou status to an urban one. This means that when 
you decide to move, you have no legal right to the benefits mentioned above in your new 
place of residency. Since migration in China has sky-rocketed in the last centuries, many 
millions of people are today living in places other than their birthplace (or their parents‟ 
birthplace). There are, thus, in China today a big number of people who are not entitled to a 
range of social benefits at their current residence. They are Chinese citizens but cannot enjoy 
the same rights as their fellow city men who are registered in the cities. Many of these 
migrants go back and forth between the city and their home village, becoming temporary 
labor migrants.  
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3. Model and General Framework 
 
The state, the hukou system and internal migration are at the focus of this thesis. They are 
interrelated in the sense that they are closely tied together as the core of current population 
movement and mobility policy in today‟s China. In the model below, we can see a simplified 
illustration of reality, with the state, the hukou system, a dualistic and segmented society 
divided into a rural and an urban part, and migration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this model, I try to demonstrate how structure and agency are intertwined – that is, how the 
state has initiated the hukou system as a control of population movement, which has indirectly 
contributed to the dualistic society present in China today (structure), and finally how these 
features affect migration (agency). This is the main focus of this thesis, but it is also important 
to remember that migrants not only are shaped by the context but that they also shape the 
context (political, economic, social and cultural) that they act and live within (Brettell 2000: 
119). This interrelationship is demonstrated by the double arrows in the model. The strong 
Chinese state, and specifically what Fan calls the migrant labor regime mentioned above, is a 
fundamental part of the Chinese society and economy. The CCP and its institutions are the 
main decision makers and constitute the state in China. They rule the political arena and there 
is no noteworthy opposition permitted. The CCP also has a lot of saying in the economic 
arena, even though the reform period has brought some change and has liberalized the market 
economy. Fan argues that the Chinese state has redefined itself in developmentalist terms 
since the reform period started in the 1970‟s. It has, however, kept control instruments from 
the socialist times which are used in order to control mobility of the population and steer it in 
The state – 
migration labor 
regime 
The hukou 
system 
Migration Dualistic 
society/econo
my – urban vs. 
rural 
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ways that advance the state‟s interests. Most importantly, the state has created the migrant 
labor regime, which is characterized by “low wages, manual work, poor working conditions, 
and other features that appeal to industrial and services employers and enable the penetration 
of global capitalist modes of production similar to those in newly industrializing economies” 
(Fan 2004: 284). The state is indeed an important factor in the study of migration flows in 
today‟s China. The CCP leadership in China has actively decided to blow new life into the 
century-old registration system, the hukou system. This system is the main institutional 
instrument the state has to control population movement and regulate internal migration. The 
system, which will be explored and explained further in chapter 6, is a complex set of rules 
that in the end prohibit people from settling at any place they desire. It deprives people of 
their right to social benefits and security that they have as citizens. The hukou system 
regulates urbanization and keeps people from settling in the cities on a permanent basis. On 
the other hand, the nation has the largest population in the world and the hukou system can be 
perceived as a means used by the state to avoid overpopulation and urban slums. Either way, 
the hukou system has clearly contributed to the formation of a dualistic society, meaning that 
there is a huge gap between the rural areas and the urban areas. In all spheres – politically, 
economically and socially – the cities are privileged over the countryside. The new market 
economy and rapidly growing industrialization has benefitted the urban areas where domestic 
and foreign investment has resulted in employment opportunities and relatively high wages. 
Here, a new and strong middle class has developed. The countryside, on the other hand, 
remains largely backwards and undeveloped. While the urban areas have received a great deal 
of state sponsored help in terms of food rationing and subsidies, the rural areas have been 
forced to be self-dependent. This led to two different economies as well, since the economic 
problems to a great extent had to be solved by the peasant population themselves without state 
support. In this context it might not be very surprising that as soon as the reform period 
started and it became easier to move and find employment elsewhere, millions of rural people 
decided to go to the cities in spite of the harsh hukou system.  
In this thesis I will argue that internal migration in China from the countryside to the urban 
areas is highly affected by the hukou system which sometimes makes the lives hard for the 
migrants. The fact that migration takes place on a large scale in China despite the rigid hukou 
system indicates a great deal of agency and determination among the migrating part of the 
population. I will further argue that the state uses the hukou system in order to arrange a 
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migrant labor regime, making sure that labor is maximized while not seeing to the best 
interests of the people constituting that labor.  
This hypothesis – that a strong state which initiates a rigid registration system in order to 
control population mobility, and a segregated and dualistic society and economy affects 
migration in China today – will be the main framework for this study. Here I will show how 
this outline corresponds to the life situations that the Chinese temporary migrants experience 
and how agency interacts with structure in this way. The hukou system, I will show, provides 
the Chinese state with an effective tool for controlling and excluding people from certain 
areas as it finds appropriate. Through the hukou system, the state has a bureaucratically valid 
excuse to use the labor force coming in from the rural areas in jobs and sectors that benefit the 
state‟s interests and boost the urban development through cheap unskilled labor. It is different 
from other countries‟ systems of registration and control since it so decisively channels people 
into specific jobs and even societal sectors (in terms of class, location and benefits). Its 
rigidity makes upwards class movement hard and even though the migrants earn more money 
in the cities than in the countryside, it is hard for them to become equal (in terms of wealth, 
feelings of belongingness and class) to the local urban population or the permanent migrants. 
By using the hukou system, the Chinese leadership manages to close the door to well-paid 
jobs in prestigious sectors for the migrants who are forced to take the lowest-pay jobs at 
sometimes dirty and dangerous workplaces where they have virtually no rights and where 
working conditions are hard. In this thesis, as I mentioned in the introduction, I seek the 
answers to issues concerning the hukou system in relation to migration in China and how 
people and the society are affected by these two contemporary phenomena. The emphasis lies 
mainly on the macro level, i.e. how the system is affecting societal structures such as 
segregation. There will, however, also be some focus on the personal experiences of the 
people living within the system and how they act given the restraints of the system.  
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4. Method – The Single Case Study 
 
In the two previous chapters I have outlined the general framework for this thesis. I have 
talked about migration in general and in relation to development and also put forward an idea 
of the Chinese situation when it comes to these matters. In the following chapters I will 
present a case study of China. This will exemplify the theoretical parts in the beginning and 
show how the hukou system works in practice. The case study as a method  is used within the 
traditional social sciences, including anthropology, and usually gives answers to questions of 
“why” and “how” (Yin 2003). Hammerslay and Gomm (2000: 3) state that case study 
research refers to research that “investigates a few cases, often just one, in considerable 
depth”. The essence of the case study is that it “tries to illuminate a decision or set of 
decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result” 
(Schramm 1971 quoted in Yin 2003: 12). Yin adds that a case study can also be focused on 
individuals, organizations, processes, programs, neighborhoods, institutions and events. 
Furthermore, a case study “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context…” (ibid. 13). In this thesis the contemporary phenomenon studied is the hukou 
system, as mentioned above. The real-life context is the internal migration taking place all 
throughout China today, as well as the migrant labor regime and the state‟s quest for 
development. I have chosen to study the hukou system as a single-case study, since it 
constitutes what Yin calls an extreme or unique case (ibid. 40). Every country has its own way 
of registering people and keeping track of their whereabouts. The Chinese hukou system, 
however, is unique in the way it so obviously excludes people and categorizes them according 
to location. People are tied to a certain geographical position and it is usually hard to get away 
from that position. This is why I find it to be an extreme case of state control, registration and 
exclusion based on geographical location. The aim of this single-case study is to “capture 
[the] case…in its uniqueness, rather than to use …[it] as basis for wider generalization or for 
the theoretical inference on some kind” (Hammersley and Gomm 2000: 3).  
The strengths and weaknesses of the case study vary according to the way the method is used. 
Factors such as the number of cases studied, how detailed the study is, the size of the cases 
and the way the researcher conducts the study and the degree of description, explanation etc, 
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influence how the method should be evaluated. One strength of the single-case study is that 
the researcher can discover causal processes that are hard to find through other forms of 
research, since the single-case researcher studies the case in-depth, over time and “in the real 
world” rather than artificial settings (Hammersley and Gomm 2000: 5-6). The critique against 
this argument is that it is unclear how to distinguish conditional from necessary relationships, 
and what role theory plays in the analysis (ibid. 6). Furthermore, there are questions about the 
role of the researcher and authenticity as well as the ability to generalize and whether this is 
important or not. The case study, thus, has weaknesses just as all other methods of research. 
However, for this thesis I found it to be the most appropriate way of conducting a study. I 
want to show how an extreme case of state control has resulted in a strict registration system 
that has largely controlled the movement of the population and contributed to the preservation 
of social stability at the expense of the freedom of the people. The single-case study method is 
convenient for this thesis, since it allows me to study the contemporary phenomenon in depth 
and to investigate the causes and effects of state control and the hukou system.  
The case study described here is based on research documentation carried out by academic 
scholars and organizations (United Nations, different human rights organizations, Migration 
Policy Institute and International Organization for Migration), with a few references to 
official Chinese sources and journalistic accounts. The academic sources I have used in this 
study are all found through academic data basis online. Among the academic scholars referred 
to, some are by far the most experienced when it comes to migration in China and the hukou 
system (for instance Solinger, Wang and Fan to mention a few). Many of them are Chinese 
themselves, while others are foreigners with a great deal of experience from China. I find 
these references to be reliable since they are gathered from academic sources of information. 
However, these scholars are often rather biased in favor of the abolition of the hukou system, 
and are often critical toward the state and its migrant labor regime. This has probably 
influenced my perception of these matters as well. On the other hand, the information about 
the hukou system and migration from official Chinese sources is parsimonious and not easy to 
find, and hence I have turned more to the sources that provide extensive information. The 
organizational sources referred to are mostly reports based on statistics, policy evaluations 
and the like. The academic researchers as well as the journalistic investigators have all spent 
time in China conducting field work in different places of both origin and destination. Their 
material includes case studies with interviews and quotes to a larger extent that the 
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organization reports. I believe that this mix of references forms a reliable platform for this 
thesis. In the following chapters I will first describe population movement in China, with the 
focus on the PRC period, and then discuss the hukou system‟s historical development and 
current form. After this I will describe what kinds of effects the hukou system has on the 
Chinese society and its people.  
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5. China’s Floating Population 
 
This chapter focuses on the migrating population in China. In the model drawn in the 
beginning of this thesis, I argued that migration in China is highly affected by the hukou 
system, and also mentioned that migration takes place in spite of the hukou system. It seems 
clear that without the existence of the hukou system, migration in China would look very 
different. The state has, through this registration system managed to control migration and 
restrict the opportunities of the migrants. In the following, I give an illustration of migration 
in China, how it has developed during the course of time and how the so called floating 
population is being perceived by their fellow countrymen in the cities. I go on by discussing 
the great regional differences present in China today, leading to the dualistic society and 
economy presented in the model. After this I want to explore why people in China migrate 
and move between different areas. I want to illustrate how migration is highly dependent on 
the state‟s migrant labor regime and how this has affected population movement during the 
last few decades in China. As will be discussed below, I find the economic causes for moving 
to be the most important ones whereas there are several others, such as social networks and 
marriage, which play important roles as well.  
 
5.1 Domestic Migration in China 
 
“Floating population” (liudong renkou) is an expression used to describe the big number of 
people moving around in China, commonly welling into the cities from the rural areas. In 
China, “floating” people are not the same as “migrating” people. Officially speaking, these 
people are not considered migrants in China, since they are seen as floating around, not 
settling permanently. This floating is usually a result of the hukou system which is not 
granting them a change of their hukou status (Solinger 1999: 15). Fan (2008: 23), describes 
the definition of the floating population as follows: 
Different from temporary migration, floating population is not based on comparing two 
points in time but is a stock measure that counts all individuals whose hukou location is 
not at the usual place of residence. A person who moved to the destination more than five 
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years ago is still considered part of the floating population if he/she has not yet moved the 
hukou to the destination. 
 In this thesis, I make no explicit difference between “floating population” and “migrants”. As 
we will see in the following, I do make a difference between permanent and temporary 
migrants (following Fan 2002 and 2008), with the latter group as my core focus of interest. If 
nothing else is mentioned, the term migrant refers to temporary, rural people migrating to an 
urban area, most often with their mind set on finding work.  
It seems rather impossible to give an exact number of migrants – people living at a different 
place than the one they are registered in - in China today. The most commonly estimated 
number, however, is that the migrants today amount to between 120 million and 150 million 
people. Most authors and researchers referenced in this thesis give this number as a hint in 
order to show how many people we are dealing with. Recent official sources, however, 
estimate that the number could be as high as 210 million (The Chinese Central Government‟s 
website). The majority of the Chinese interprovincial migrants originate from the central 
south provinces and from southwestern China (for example Anhui, Jiangxi and Hunan). The 
most important destination provinces are located on the eastern coast (for instance 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Fujian) (Fan 2008: 37-39). The main goal of these 
farmers-turned-migrant workers is to “…make money and get rich in the cities” (Zhang 2001: 
1). Some of the migrant workers manage to bring a small capital with them to the cities, and 
can start up a small business and take part of the blossoming free market in today‟s China. 
Most of them, however, are poor farmers who only have their labor force to sell. They are 
often employed in construction sites, restaurants, factories, street cleaning and similar jobs, 
which the urban permanent population is unwilling to do. Shen (2002: 363) calls the jobs 
available for the temporary migrants, 3D (Difficult, Demanding and Dangerous) jobs. Some 
are not lucky enough to find employment, however, and these people often drift around from 
place to place without finding any job (Zhang 2001: 2).  “Permanent migrants” and 
“temporary migrants” are two different groups of migrants. The first category refers to those 
migrants who are sponsored by the state and significantly privileged over the latter category 
which is “outside of state plan” and inferior to the first group. Writes Fan: “The young, 
distorted, and segmented labor market fully reflects the institutional barriers blocking peasant 
migrants from prestigious jobs, as well as individuals‟ position in a rigid institutional 
hierarchy” (Fan 2002: 103).  
27 
 
 
5.2 Migration in the PRC 
 
During the first decades of communist rule in China it was very hard for the Chinese people to 
move and resettle in a new area. The regulations were harsh and the majority of the 
population was tied to their rural land through their hukou status. The insufficient access to 
employment and resources of food and housing made the government focus on satisfying the 
urban population and their need for these things. The rural population played an important 
part in keeping a constant flow of products available to the urban population. But in the 
1950‟s, China actually faced quite a large urbanization, as many migrated into the cities in 
search for industrial employment. As a result of the disastrous GLF and the economic crisis 
that followed, however, the state sharply restricted rural-urban migration again. Between 1960 
and 1978, it was practically impossible to change one‟s hukou status from an agricultural to a 
non-agricultural one (Mallee 2000: 85). Migration was tightly controlled as a means to keep 
stable social order. Urban population was seen as a serious potential threat to state power and 
because of this,  
urban life was rigidly controlled with work units and neighbourhood committees 
dominating most aspects of city life. Migrants did not fit neatly into this system. Security 
officials viewed them as „rootless‟ people who, lacking the constraints of government and 
community, were prone to behave in „antisocial‟ or criminal ways. Labor migration, 
posing a potential threat to social and political stability, was conceptualized primarily as a 
public order issue (ibid). 
In other words the government regarded the migrating population, far away from its home 
villages, as uncontrollable and simply did not let them come into the cities. They were not in 
the place where they “were supposed to be”, and this worried the state. Mallee (2000: 85) 
points out that this made the relationship with the state very different for the rural population 
and the urban citizens, respectively. Whereas the rural part of the population was supposed to 
be completely self-sufficient and could only depend on itself, the state provided the urban 
population with everything they needed.  
Since 1978, when the reform era started, much has happened in terms of migration in China. 
As soon as the state let go of some of its control and people were allowed to move, there was 
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a wave of migrants pouring into towns and cities, especially in the coastal areas. The state, 
interested in industrialization and development, had to realize that an increased productivity 
was impossible without a free labor market and a change of the pre-reform model of 
economy. The “iron rice bowl” was replaced with a system based on competitiveness and the 
state to a large extent retreated. The number of SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) decreased 
and gave place to a growing number of privately owned companies and to foreign-invested 
business. Consumerism has transformed China as well, and the efficiency in labor has 
increased significantly, constantly producing new and more products for the domestic and 
foreign markets (Fan 2002: 107). The rural population, having been highly restricted 
mobility-wise for the past decades, now saw its opportunity to look for employment in the 
prosperous areas by the coast (and, today, in the Special Economic Zones – SEZs) that now 
needed fresh labor force. Many new job opportunities were available for the migrant workers 
– nannies, restaurants waiters and factory workers are examples of jobs that require cheap 
labor and that the local urban population was (and still is today) uninterested in doing (ibid). 
Not only the growing demand for labor in the cities, resulting from a wide range of changes 
there, caused this massive migration. Reforms made in the countryside also affected the 
growing migration; the abolition of collectives in the agricultural areas meant that rural people 
were now free to pursue non-agricultural activities. Many started selling their products at 
markets and the long-distance trading ban was lifted in the beginning of the 1980‟s. Now 
people could stay in the cities for a longer time without having to depend on rationing 
coupons for their sustenance (Mallee 2000: 89). Millions of migrant workers were employed 
by the urban enterprises. They were cheap to hire and they were willing to take on jobs in 
mining and construction that usually were hard to find labor for. The state‟s view of the 
migrant workers started to change during this period; “the authorities gradually came to see 
„temporary‟ labour as a way to reconcile the urban need for (cheap) labour with the state‟s 
need to reduce the financial burden of urban entitlements” (ibid).  
In the last years of the 1980‟s, China was stricken by serious inflation. This led to the 
cancellation of many construction works and the closing of rural enterprises. Despite the drop 
in employment opportunity, the rural to urban migration increased during this time. This, says 
Mallee (2000: 91), is evidence showing that migration is not simply a result of urban demand. 
The continuing migration despite the decline of job opportunities is a clear example of the 
Todaro model (which will be discussed later in the thesis), stating that the expected wages in 
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the cities are the real temptation that makes people move, and not necessarily the actual 
incomes levels there. Between 50 and 60 million of rural individuals were working in the 
cities at the beginning of the 1990‟s (Mallee 2000: 91).  
Every year around the Spring Festival (or New Year Festival) in January or February, millions 
of migrant workers are returning to their home villages to celebrate, bring home remittances 
and to meet their families and friends. Students and state employees are going home as well 
for the festival, but it is the migrants who are getting all the attention from media and the 
authorities. In 1989 around this time, there was a growing sense of panic apparently visible 
among the authorities concerning the amount of migrant workers coming back to the cities 
after visiting their home towns or villages. The transportation system, highly underdeveloped, 
could not handle all the people returning and soon the phenomenon of “migrant worker wave” 
was established – the migrants seemed to simply pour into the cities without a plan or realistic 
purpose. Mallee (2001: 91-92) states that this expression and view of the migrants had two 
long-term consequences. The stereotypical image of migrants “as „blind‟ drifters who, 
propelled by enormous rural employment pressure („surplus labourers‟), „flocked‟ to the cities 
or „roamed‟ around the country in search of work” was further strengthened. It also helped to 
reinforce the image of rural migrants as a social problem and public order issue (ibid). The 
migrants coming to the cities are often not welcomed by the other population residing there. 
They are often considered to be displaced and are repeatedly looked down upon by the local 
urban residents. Despite their incredible efforts and contributions to the economic 
development, the migrant population continues to be considered, by some, a social problem. 
According to Fan (2008: 113), migrant workers are often, publicly and officially criticized for 
“overloading urban infrastructure such as transportation and housing, creating chaos in urban 
management, violating the birth-control policy, engaging in criminal activities, and spreading 
sexually transmitted diseases”.  In a way, due to the lack of a stable structural position in 
society, the migrants are parts of neither the rural nor the urban part of the nation. (Zhang 
2001: 27). The migrants have always had a hard time being accepted socially by the other 
urban population, and the integration process has been slow. At the same time, they might 
lose their identity in the rural areas as well when leaving their villages behind. The social 
segregation caused by the hukou system, is a serious problem in China today and an obstacle 
to successful integration and assimilation. 
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5. 3 Growing Regional Gaps and Poor Integration 
 
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping made his famous journey to the south, visiting cities like Guangzhou 
and Shenzhen and declaring them the first SEZs. The economy in these areas soon boomed 
and became even more prosperous than before, with high profits and efficient productivity. In 
the countryside, however, the situation was different. Agricultural income decreased due to 
changes in prices and the restoration of the compulsory grain deliveries. Furthermore, taxes, 
levies and extortions made life even harder for the peasants. Therefore, “[w]hile the economy 
as a whole grew at a dazzling pace, the differences between the richer and poorer parts of the 
population became more pronounced” (Mallee 2000: 93). Now, urbanization grew at a slower 
pace and the total migrating population was estimated to somewhere around 80 million (ibid).  
Throughout the reform period, the hukou system has restricted migration and has worked as a 
tool for controlling the so called “floating population”, and the integration of the new urban 
population leaves much to desire.  
Wang and Zuo (1999: 277-278) suggest five factors explaining the gap between the migrant 
workers holding rural hukou and the local urban population. The first concerns the labor 
market, which is highly segmented. As I already have mentioned, the migrants often take on 
dirty, dangerous and low-wage jobs that the urban local population are unwilling to do. The 
temporary migrants and the local urban population “…participate in two different labor 
markets”. While occupations with higher status, such as enterprise and government leaders, 
official clerks and other white-collar jobs, to a high percentage are occupied by local 
residents, only a very small number of temporary hukou holders have jobs like these. The 
second reason given by Wang and Zuo is the low wages and poor benefits provided for the 
migrants. They mention subsidized housing, meals provided at work, childcare, transportation 
and entertainment as benefits that are given to the local employees, but inaccessible to the 
migrant workers. The general cash income of migrant workers is significantly lower than that 
of the local employees, even though the first group work longer hours every week than the 
latter. Temporary housing and residential segregation is the third aspect taken up by Wang 
and Zuo as a cause to the big gap between local residents and rural migrants. The great 
majority of the local people can uphold a fairly big living space per person (15.7 square 
meters in 1995, according to Wang and Zuo). The migrant workers, however, usually live at 
the workplace or at the employer‟s home. Fan (2008: 109) writes that providing living space 
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for the workers is a strategy that many employers take to in order to utilize the workers‟ labor 
force to the fullest. By requiring the migrant workers to sleep and eat at the work site the 
employers make it easy to “…impose disciplinary regulations on the workers, facilitates 
employees‟ working long hours, and isolates migrants from the world outside the work place” 
(ibid). Even for those migrants who rent their housing, the per capita living space is about half 
that of the local residents. The rent is also higher, about six times that of the local resident 
renters. As if this was not bad enough, Wang and Zuo conclude that “[n]ot only do rural 
migrants pay much more for much less space, what they get is often also inferior housing” 
(Wang and Zuo 1999: 278). Individual instead of family migration is the fourth cause listed. 
Many of the migrating rural people are either single or married but with the spouse residing at 
a different place. Hence, most migrants are moving without their family. Since the urban labor 
market demands a young and diligent work force, this high share of unmarried migrants might 
not be surprising. Social segregation is the fifth and last reason. Wang and Zuo state that the 
migrant population is not well integrated with the rest of the urban population. Like other 
researchers, as we have seen, they observe the stereotypical image of the migrants that local 
residents often hold – that migrant workers are ignorant, dirty and often criminal. The hard 
conditions for the migrants in the cities make many of them stay there for a few years and 
then return home to the rural town or village where they came from, go back to agricultural 
work or start up a small business of their own.  
The reform period‟s changes in the hukou system have opened up for an enormous increase in 
migration in China and have led some scholars and observers to conclude that the system is 
no longer very valid or effective. This statement is, however, not backed by most of the 
scholars whose research I have studied (as will be illustrated in chapter 6). On the contrary, 
the hukou system has transformed power relations and today Chinese domestic migrants are 
exposed to a great variety of discrimination. The human rights organization Human Rights in 
China (HRIC) states that the reforms of the hukou system were never aimed at stopping the 
control of migration prevalent in the earlier decades of CCP rule. Instead, says HRIC, they 
have “constructed complex new barriers to migrants‟ entry into the cities and a web of 
discriminatory rules that effectively put them in a similar situation to “guest workers”, illegal 
migrants or sans papiers in rich countries” (HRIC 2002: 1). 
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5.4 Why Do People Migrate? 
 
In the text above, I have tried to give the reader an idea of the development of domestic 
migration in China, and an illustration of the great gaps between the local urban residents and 
the migrant population that prevails in the cities. We have seen that many of the migrants in 
the cities are discriminated against because of the hukou system and that they in many cases 
are regarded as second class citizens. Furthermore, the hukou system is an obstacle to 
migration, highly restrictive to both permanent movement and the access to employment in 
certain sectors. Despite this, the Chinese still migrate on a large scale. So, why do people 
migrate to these environments that often are clearly disadvantageous to them? In the 
following I want to explore why people move. I will now look more deeply into the empirical 
data provided through books and articles and further explore how different factors contribute 
to the decision-making. The push and pull factors discussed in chapter 2 will be exemplified 
in this chapter. More specifically, I have chosen to look at economic causes for moving 
(which I find to be the most important ones), social and kinship networks as causes of 
migration, and, finally, marriage migration. 
 Fan (2008: 54) emphasizes the heterogeneity of migration reasons, saying that one should 
look at different types of and motives for migration in order to fully understand population 
movement in China. A common dichotomy used to categorize migration motives is that of 
economic versus social (including life-cycle) reasons. The economic motives include such 
factors as “job transfer”, “job assignment” and “industry/business”, whereas 
“friends/relatives”, “retirement”, “joining family” and “marriage” belong to the social 
motives. The “study/training” reason is harder to categorize, as it can be both considered an 
economic reason as well as a life cycle change. This dichotomy is used in the 1990 and 2000 
censuses, which are “…by far the most comprehensive national-level sources of data on 
population movements in China”, according to Fan (ibid: 13). These censuses are based on 
material printed by the National Bureau of Statistics and are frequently used by researchers. 
The economic versus social dichotomy is, however, not enough when trying to understand 
migration in China. State institutions are strong in China and particularly the hukou system 
has played a key role in shaping population movement in the nation. As noted in chapter 2, 
the role of the state is not satisfactory emphasized in much of the literature concerning 
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migration. Fan calls for another dichotomy, that of “state sponsored” (plan) migration, versus 
“self-initiated” (market) migration (ibid: 55). Plan migration is initiated and controlled by the 
state and is authorized by the state in a way that benefits the state‟s interests. Migration 
initiated by the state is “within state plan” and is often associated with changes in hukou 
status allowing people to become permanent migrants (Fan 2008: 55-56). “Self-initiated” 
migration, on the other hand, is “…primarily initiated by the migrants themselves and tends to 
be identified with market forces and regarded as activities „outside of state plan‟” (ibid: 56). 
These migrants cannot count on receiving local urban hukou status, and are not as privileged 
as the plan (or permanent) migrants. “Industry/business”, “family/relatives” and “marriage” 
are usually considered self-initiated motives for moving, while “job transfer”, “job 
assignment”, “joining family”, “retirement” and “study/training” are considered state 
sponsored motives. This dichotomy helps out in the categorization and simplification of 
migration in today‟s China. In the following, I will be discussing the three motives behind 
self-initiated migration, i.e. the industry/business (called economic causes), family/relatives 
(called social- and kinship networks) and marriage.  
 
5.4.1 Economic Causes 
 
I will start by looking into the economic factors causing migration. As we know, the most 
common places of destination are the cities and coastal areas, and the most common place of 
migrant origin is the countryside (Zhu 2007: 66). As I have already stated, the countryside in 
China is highly underdeveloped compared to the urban areas and the income gaps are big 
between the two areas. This gap is the most significant feature of the rising inequality in the 
reform period. In 2000, the rural income was 35.9% of that of urban income. In comparison, 
in 1985 it was 53.8% of the urban income (Qin et al. 2009: 71). The income gap has, thus, 
increased during recent years. In the reform era, China‟s transitional economy has moved 
away from the Maoist economic thinking, and is now identified by uneven regional 
distribution. Writes Fan (1999: 959): “[u]nlike Maoist policies, which made an effort to 
spread resources to inland provinces, post-Mao development policies have unequivocally 
favored coastal provinces, where disproportionate state investment has been allocated…”. 
Movement from the poor countryside to the more prosperous coastal areas is, thus, often a 
result of economic factors.  
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The developmentalist state needs the cheap labor force that only a poor and underdeveloped 
countryside with a great surplus of labor can offer. Being unable to support oneself and one‟s 
family on the salaries provided in rural labor such as agriculture, is a strong incentive for 
moving away and becoming temporary labor migrants in the cities‟ growing economy. The 
market economy and the freer labor market, including township and village enterprises and a 
growing number of privately owned enterprises, existing in China today surely makes the 
cities an attractive option for rural people willing to work hard in order to earn money. This 
means that population movement in China is largely influenced by, and perhaps even 
dependent on, changes in state policy (Yu 2008). The large quantity of surplus labor makes it 
hard for rural people to find employment in the countryside and causes many to go look for 
jobs in the cities. In a survey from 1985, the contributing peasants stated that the most 
common reason for moving to the cities was that agriculture could not produce a large enough 
income. The second most common reason was that they had too little land to produce the 
adequate grain and that the surplus labor in the countryside was too large (Solinger 1999: 
154). Fan (2008: 71) quotes a woman saying “In our family there is plenty of labor but very 
little land. I had nothing to do at home, so I decided to find migrant work”. This quote further 
strengthens the conception that the economic motives for moving are by far the most 
prevailing ones. However, the so called “Todaro migration model”, stresses that the actual 
income level in the urban centers is not the primary motive for migration. Instead, it is the 
migrant‟s expectation of the salaries available in the cities that is critical when he or she 
decides to move. With the starting point in the urban-rural differences in expected income, 
rather than actual income, the migrant has to consider the relative benefits and costs of 
migration. Such aspects as possible unemployment need to be calculated and compared to the 
possible income that could result from migration. In other words “[a]s long as the present 
value of the net stream of expected urban income over the migrant‟s planning horizon [i.e. 
how long it will take to find employment] exceeds that of the expected rural income, the 
decision to migrate is justifiable” (Todaro and Smith 2006: 341).   
Another aspect confirming the importance of the economic motivations is the fact that many 
temporary migrants choose to stay in the cities only for a limited period of time. They often 
see the city as a place to make money, and not as their home. The insecurity of the labor 
market - in terms of employment and discriminatory wages - makes the loyalty to the 
employer low among the migrant workers and the chance of building a successful career is 
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very small. Furthermore, the lack of urban hukou leaves most peasant migrants no other 
option then to return home after earning a certain amount of money (Fan 2008: 113). 
According to Yang (2000: 179), the average period of stay for an employed migrant worker is 
259 days. It is estimated that about one third of all migrants in China will return home. The 
consequences of the great level of return migration can be both positive and negative. For 
example, return migrants can bring with them capital, skills, knowledge, technologies and 
entrepreneurship which benefits the countryside. On the other hand, return migration further 
aggravates the problem of surplus labor in the countryside (Zhao 2002: 377). The decision to 
become a temporary migrant is usually based on a few other economic considerations, besides 
the purely monetary ones. The potential migrant also has to evaluate, for instance, the 
potential loss of the opportunity to cultivate one‟s land in the village. Rural land, in China, is 
usually allocated on a rent-free, contract basis. This implies that to leave the land could mean 
an opportunity cost (Knight and Yueh 2009: 80). Hence, a range of things need to be thought 
through before making the final decision to move: “the combination of the security provided 
by access to land, the cost of withdrawal from the village, the relatively low income from 
farming, the lack of security in the city, and the difficulties of urban settlement means that for 
many rural households the best available option is to send out a migrant on temporary basis” 
(ibid).  
It is observed that the migrant income benefits the total rural income. In 1999, the migrant 
income was counted to approximately 9.25 percent of the total rural income, and in 2003 the 
number was up to 13.2 percent (Fan 2008: 118). This shows how important migration is for 
the revenues and living standards of the rural population – the Chinese countryside is 
dependent on migration. Migration is, however, not only benefiting the countryside - the cities 
owe a lot to the migrant workers as well. They are the ones who work hard around the clock 
in order for the urban Chinese economy to grow at the amazing pace it has during the last 
decades. The cities and the government need them in order to be able to provide the rest of the 
world with cheap consumer products, export huge quantities of products every year, and offer 
the cheapest labor force available for foreign investors. Still, the leadership and the urban 
local residents do not welcome the migrant workers with open arms;”They see the migrants 
workers as a necessary evil – necessary to the economy but harmful to the legal order” (van 
Luyn 2008: 2).  
36 
 
One migrant worker who has left the countryside in order to find employment in the city is 
twenty-two-year-old Bai Chuiying who left her home village at the age of seventeen. She 
lives now in Beijing and tries to find employment as a hairdresser. Once arriving in the city, 
she found out that the image she had about city life was not corresponding to reality. She has 
had a hard time finding job as a hairdresser, which she was trained for. As so many other 
migrant girls and women, she had barely started working before she was asked to do „more‟ – 
meaning sexual services. When she refused, her boss immediately fired her. Chuiying says 
that many of the girls perform these services because they want to earn more money: “They 
earn $600 a month, four times as much as with just cutting hair. For many girls the temptation 
is irresistible” (quoted in van Luyn 2008: 99). In the end, she would like to go home to her 
village but wants to make enough money first. She needs it in order realize her dream of 
opening her own hairdressing salon in her home village. She says that she wants to show other 
peasant girls that they have opportunities and that they can profit from the cities (ibid). The 
story of Chuiying shows how rough life in the cities can be for a migrant worker looking for 
employment and money. The fact that peasant girls can earn as much as $600 by prostitution 
in the cities, compared with the income levels in the countryside, surely must lead many 
young girls into this industry. 
As we have seen, the insufficient income levels in rural areas as well as the amount of surplus 
labor are key factors leading people to migrate to more prosperous areas in hopes of better 
employment there. The remittances sent back home constitute an important share of the total 
rural economy, meaning that the countryside is relatively dependent on migration. Many 
migrants move to the cities with the sole intention to make money and improve their own life 
situation. However, many of them only stay for a certain period of time and few settle down 
permanently. This shows that few of them feel like the city is their home. The hukou system 
also hinders them from settling down permanently in the cities. The story of Chuiying 
illustrates the harsh conditions for the migrants in the cities, and how far some of them are 
willing to go in order to make money. 
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5.4.2 Social- and Kinship Networks 
 
Many migrants in China do not only move to the cities due to economic factors. Many follow 
in the tracks of others, usually family members or friends who have moved there before them 
and who can help out with employment and housing. Social networks as well as kinship 
networks are essential factors contributing to the decision to migrate. Within anthropology it 
is considered important to study these kinds of networks, not only as important to the 
migration process, but also as providers of human capital (Brettell 2000: 108). In China, the 
migrants‟ social and kinship networks are usually made up of people migrating from the same 
place to the same destination, settle down in the same area and sometimes work for the same 
employer. Most of the Chinese migrants, just like migrants around the world, are “…drawn 
out of their home places by friends, relatives, and fellow villagers” (Solinger 1999: 176). 
According to Solinger, the percent of migrants who move to the cities because their family or 
friends were able to locate a job for them there, is probably over 50 percent nationwide (ibid). 
Employers seem to prefer this kind of recruitment as well, often ordering their employees to 
bring more labor force from their villages back home. For the migrant the fellow villager or 
relative can, in addition to finding a job, offer help with accommodation, emotional support 
and sustenance (ibid). Many migrants do not trust the local governments and employment 
agencies that actively try to recruit people, but rely instead on their social networks when 
looking for employment elsewhere. Fan (2008: 98) quotes a man in Sichuan talking about 
these matters: 
Most of the time, employment agencies cannot get you a job even after you pay the fee. 
Or, they‟ll find you low-paying jobs that are too demanding. Sometimes the employer 
[via employment agencies] refuses to pay even after you‟ve finished the work. Therefore, 
most people prefer to find jobs via their relatives and friends. You only need to give them 
a gift, or you simply owe them a favor. Relatives and friends can tell you everything 
about the work place, the wage, etc. Then you can decide whether you want to take the 
job or not. 
The poor integration of the migrants into the urban society, further explains why people want 
to move and stay with other people from their village or friends and relatives. In the city, such 
characteristics as different dialects, different cuisine and regional culture, make the migrants 
segregated from the rest of the urban population (Fan 2008: 111). The comfort of a social 
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network consisting of people who share one‟s origin and presumptions surely is reassuring. 
Many migrants live together with people they know from back home, and they often band 
together when going out for a walk, shopping or watching a movie since they are afraid of 
being bullied if they go out by themselves. Some even form mutual help groups, and “stand in 
for sick fellow workers, lend each other money, and fight (in the street or with the boss) if 
necessary” (Mallee 2000:98). In many places, the migrants originating from a certain place 
often form an ethnic community in the city of destination. The most known and researched of 
these is the Zhejiang Village in Beijing, where natives from the province of Zhejiang (and 
especially from the Wenzhou municipality) clustered and together built a special community 
of their own, only to see themselves being forced out of it in 1995. The village became fully 
constituted in 1986, as thousands of people poured in to the city. In the middle of the 1990‟s, 
an estimated one hundred thousand people resided here, most originated from Zhejiang 
(Solinger 1999: 254). It seems a bit unclear how large a territory the village holds, but it is 
spread over numerous large suburban neighborhoods in the capital. Even though the 
boundaries of the village are somewhat fuzzy, it is clear that the area in question is quite 
significant in size (Zhang 2001: 19). Zhejiang Village is a perfect example of how important 
the social and kinship networks are for contemporary Chinese migrants. When new migrants 
arrived, they were immediately taken care of by the earlier migrants, who provided them with 
jobs in the village‟s niche business of textile. Most were involved in tailoring trade, 
assembling, manufacturing and selling of garments, whereas the remains were occupied with 
serving and helping the tailors and salespeople. For some time, the village was left to its own 
without interference from the state, and soon the people living there had established their own 
restaurants, barbershops, hospital, repair shops, kinder garden, markets etc. The need for 
outside assistance steadily decreased and the community became self-supportive and 
somewhat independent from the state, and highly dependent on function support networks of 
fellow county-men (Solinger 1999: 254). However, in 1995, the Zhejiang village was targeted 
by the state. In the time period of two weeks, thousands of migrant workers residing here 
were forced to leave the city and were driven away to Beijing‟s most remote parts. Houses 
were torn down as well, in what Zhang (2001: 1) calls a “…battle for space, power, and social 
order”.  
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Migration due to the connection to family members, friends and fellow villagers is an 
important aspect of migration in China. This motive for moving is, however, also closely 
linked to the monetary reasons. Most of the migrants, who follow someone they know to the 
place of destination, usually do so because the contact can arrange employment (often at the 
same work place as he or she is working) and also help finding housing. The social networks 
are very important for many migrants at the place of destination. They form communities that 
in many ways are separated from the bigger community surrounding them, and migrants find 
comfort in having familiar people around them. The fact that migrants often recruit new 
migrants to the cities clearly shows that migrants in China are not “blind drifters”, pouring 
into urban areas uncontrollably and that “labor migration of peasants and their incorporation 
into urban work do not take place haphazardly” (Fan 2008: 97). The migration from specific 
areas to specific destinations, followed by the employment in certain jobs and sectors and the 
whole job search in general is indeed highly orderly and organized (ibid).  
 
5.4.3 Marriage Migration 
 
In addition to the factors of economy and social networks, marriage as a motive for migration 
is important as well, in order to understand the patterns of internal migration in China. 
Marriage is traditionally considered a social motive for moving, and a result of personal 
interest and desire. However, marriage can also be seen as an economic motive for migration 
and is thus a bit harder to categorize than purely monetary motives and social networks. In the 
following we will look deeper into marriage migration in China and what role the hukou 
system plays in shaping the lives of people involved in this kind of migration. As we have 
seen, migration during the Mao-era was highly restricted. Actually, marriage was one of the 
few acceptable reasons for moving permitted by the state. Marriage migration has mainly 
meant that women are the mobile ones, moving a certain distance to her new husband‟s home 
(Davin 2007: 84). Marriage has traditionally been considered highly important for the well-
being of a woman, and has been the cornerstone of gender roles in the Confucian China. 
Getting married has, hence, been an inevitable life event for Chinese people. This stress on 
marriage has been especially strong in the patriarchic countryside, where hypergamy 
(marrying up) has often been the only way out of a life in poverty and misery (Fan 2008: 
139).  In the past, marrying someone not far from one‟s home village has been the most 
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common practice of marriage migration. Since marriage in rural China historically has been, 
and might still be, a result of pragmatic transitions and economic interests, the proximity of 
the two families is rather important. The families arranging the marriage are interested in 
“…the continuation of the family line, increase in family labor resources, formation of 
networks, provision of old-age security, and transfer of economic resources” (ibid: 140). With 
time, and especially in the reform period, the marriage migration has expanded spatially. 
Today, long-distance marriage migration is fairly common and women move between 
provinces to a greater extent than before. In 2000, 12 percent of inter-provincial migration 
was due to marriage. The gender difference is significant – 20.5% of the women in one survey 
stated that marriage was the main motive for moving, whereas only 2.8% of the men moved 
due to marriage (Davin 2007: 84). The direction of movement usually goes from poorer areas 
to areas with higher income. More precisely, people usually move from China‟s western parts 
to the more prosperous eastern regions (Bossen 2007: 103). This is partly due to the 
increasing economic gaps in today‟s China. These regional gaps drive people to migrate to the 
more wealthy regions and many do this through hypergamy. The increasingly important long-
distance marriage migration can, thus, at least partly be explained through economic 
development. By marrying a man from a wealthier province, the woman tries to improve her 
own poor life situation. As it is hard or impossible to gain a permanent hukou status in the 
cities, many women might hope that they will acquire this through marriage. An important 
point, taken up by Fan (2008: 142) is that the hukou system is indeed significantly affecting 
the marriage patterns in China. Peasant women who lack urban hukou status and who come 
from a modest background are not very desirable on the “urban marriage market”. Therefore, 
the opportunities for women wishing to marry up have been restricted to rural areas. Fan 
claims that it is very hard for rural migrant women to find an urban husband, and that the only 
urban men available to them are those who have some kind of undesirable attribute, such as 
old age or disability. Furthermore, the fact that hukou status until recently was inherited 
through the mother meant that many urban men avoided marrying rural women since their 
children would then have a rural hukou status as well. A few years ago, however, this was 
changed so that today children can inherit the hukou status of either parent. 
 Even though long-distance marriage migration has increased, most women still move to 
places rather close to their home. Characteristic of the marriage migrating women in China is 
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that they are low-educated and come from poor areas. They are also low-skilled which affects 
their competitiveness on the urban labor market and in the cities overall. Those who have the  
most severe human capital and locational constraints are most prone to resort to marriage 
migration. They have very limited opportunities for social and economic mobility other 
than marriage, and their willingness to move long distances and be away from familiar 
environments can be interpreted as a price they are willing to pay in order to overcome 
these constraints (Fan 2008: 149).  
As we have seen, marriage migration is not purely a social factor, but actually plays an 
important economic role for many people in today‟s China. Labor migration opens up for 
marriage migration as well. As people start to move around the nation, the marriage market of 
available spouses is extended and people can end up moving to various parts of the country, 
depending on the origin of the husband. Therefore, migration that started with purely 
economic motivations can result in completely different motivations. I would, however, like 
to argue that the economic motivations for migration are the most important. The authors 
quoted in this thesis all seem to agree that the economic aspects are the dominant for the 
floating population moving back and forth between the city and countryside. As we have 
seen, motivations for migration that at first glance look like social or personal can in fact be 
highly economic. Marriage is one such blurry motivation hard to categorize.  
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6. The Chinese Hukou System  
 
In this chapter I will describe the Chinese hukou system in depth. Its development during the 
PRC as well as its present form will be in focus, and I intend to give a thorough description of 
the implications of the system. 
 
6. 1 Origins and Development to 1949 
 
The Chinese hukou system, or registration system, has a long history dating back to the 3d 
century and the Qin dynasty. Almost all dynasties since that time, as well as Guomindang‟s 
Republic of China (1912-1949), have adopted the system to various degrees and with varying 
effectiveness. At present, the hukou system “…divides and organizes the people based on 
locational and family-membership differentiation as recognized and determined by the state” 
(Wang 2005: 32). The system in today‟s China has its origins in the so called xiangsui and 
baojia of imperial times. The baojia system was fully implemented by the Qin Kingdom in 
western China in 375 B.C. In 221 B.C. when Qin finally united China, the baojia registration 
system was expanded and became nationwide. At this time, writes Wang, the state increased 
its social control over the population: “Everyone was required to report residence, age, 
gender, and profession to the authorities. The state verified such information three times a 
year, and everyone needed official approval to change registration before moving. Illegal 
migrants were called wangmin (fugitives) and subject to prosecution and harsh punishment” 
(Wang 2005: 35).  
As we can see, the hukou system has deep historical roots in the Chinese society and even 
though the functions of the system have changed during the course of time, the emphasis on 
control over the population‟s mobility, collection of personal information and preservation of 
sociopolitical stability has continued to be stressed throughout the centuries. During the 
dynasties following Qin, the hukou system was used to different extent and in different 
settings. During the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368), for instance, registration was based on 
ethnicity, family membership and profession. The ruling Mongols particularly used the ethnic 
registration as a means to exclude and discriminate the Han Chinese (Wang 2005: 41). In the 
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last two dynasties, the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1912) dynasties, the hukou system 
was even more deeply implemented. During both dynasties, people were obliged to hang 
plaques outside their doors, revealing their hukou information such as native origin, number 
of residents and the presence of any possible guest. All families had to be ready for inspection 
of this information at any time. The Qing leaders also used the registration system to keep 
track of criminal individuals who were registered in special books in order for the officials to 
keep better control over them (ibid). The nationalist party Guomindang (also called 
Kuomintang) that founded and ruled the Republic of China (1912-1949) also used the hukou 
system, especially to target the greatest internal enemy, the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). 
Families were organized into different categories and officials appointed by the state ruled 
these people on a local level. “Political and ideological deviance became something that 
households watched each other for” and the CCP later admitted that this kind of control 
turned out to be very important in weakening the communists (ibid. 42). The PRC hukou 
system is colored by its origins, but there have also been several reforms of the system since 
1949 that have determined the faiths of millions of Chinese, in terms of mobility and life 
opportunities. In the following, I will look closer at the PRC hukou system and the 
development from the Mao era through the reform period beginning in the late 1970‟s, to the 
present time.  
 
6.2 The Hukou System 1949-1978 
 
From the very beginning of the power shift in 1949, when the CCP took over as the leader of 
the country, the hukou system played an important role. According to Wang (2005: 44), the 
CCP leaders decided to blow new life into the practice of the hukou since history had showed 
it to be an effective tool for social control and organization. The role model for China at this 
point was the Soviet Union, whose registration system propiska “…provided the new 
ideological coating, political rationale, and practice example for the CCP” (ibid). The system 
was an attempt by the new leadership to deal with the demographic pressure resulting from 
the nation‟s socialist industrialization (Wu and Treiman 2004). In the beginning of the 1950‟s, 
however, the hukou system functioned mainly as a monitoring mechanism of population 
movement, and was not aimed at controlling this movement. This was actually a period 
characterized by relative freedom of movement, and the constitution from 1954 even 
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guaranteed the people‟s freedom to choose location of residency and the right to migrate 
freely (Chan and Zhang 1999: 820). But the new socialist industrialization grew rapidly and 
as a part of the first Five-Year Plan, millions of peasants from the countryside were recruited 
to the metropolises as labor force. Yet others were moving into the cities to find employment 
by themselves. This caused great demographic pressure on the urban areas, and when the 
pressure became too big a problem the government began to use the hukou system as a means 
of distributing the population, by excluding certain people from the metropolises. The hukou 
system was used to send back millions of unemployed migrants that had already moved to the 
cities, from their home villages and –towns (Wu and Treiman 2004: 364). At least in the 
beginning of the 1950‟s, people largely accepted relocation mainly because of two reasons. 
First, the moving was done without force and people moved fairly voluntarily. Financial 
support from the state facilitated the process and only those in need of “ideological re-
education” were subject to compulsory relocation. The second reason was that many migrants 
were provided with land and other state subsidies once they returned to the countryside. “This 
support, plus free transportation, attracted many unemployed and poor urban residents, 
particularly recent migrants from the countryside” (Cheng and Selden 1994: 648-649).  
In the very beginning of the 1950‟s, as the industrialization in China started to kick off, the 
food scarcities in the country became clear. In 1953, the CCP leaders decided that rationing 
was needed, and the peasants were forced to sell a certain share of their grain to the state. At 
the same time as the hukou system was reinforced in 1955, the State Council introduced the 
Temporary Methods for Supplying Urban Grain Rations, which made clear that only the 
urban population were to benefit from the state‟s grain rationing. Anyone residing in the cities 
without the proper registration could not take part of the food rationing and the hukou system 
played a big part in resource allocation of this time. The grain rationing was yet another 
aspect contributing to the effective restriction of internal migration in China (Solinger 1999: 
43-44). Soon the rationing was extended from only concerning grain, to involve also cotton 
and oil crops and after a few years it included all major foodstuff and agricultural products. 
By forcing all peasants to sell a share of the products to the state, the government tried to 
channel rural capital to the cities (Cheng and Selden 1994: 657). The communist China 
showed, in the early years of the 1950‟s, close to an obsession with solving urban problems 
and securing the livelihood of the urban population. The state took on a big responsibility 
towards the citizens in the cities and guaranteed them housing, employment and, as 
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mentioned, food. For many years to come, Chinese cities lacked all those problems of urban 
slums and poverty that other metropolises around the world have been forced to face. 
Continuous unemployment, beggars and squatter settlements have been absent in Shanghai, 
Beijing and the other big cities of China. By controlling the inflow of people to the cities, the 
number of urban dwellers was kept low and this made welfare programs easier to implement. 
By contrast, of course, the countryside was extremely poor and it would take a long time until 
the development of the cities reached these regions. When the state removed its financial 
responsibility from the countryside, the economic problems had to be solved by the rural 
society instead, which led to a dual system in which the surplus from the countryside poured 
into urban state projects and the state capital benefited only the cities as well (ibid. 650-651).  
In 1955, the State Council passed The Directive Concerning Establishment of a Permanent 
System of Household Registration (Cheng and Selden 1994: 654), thus implementing a full-
scale hukou system, where people were categorized as either “agricultural” or “non-
agricultural”. In other words, this is when the practice of giving people a specific hukou status 
came into practice, which brought with it “… a sharp differentiation of rights and privileges 
and extremely stringent conditions for converting from rural to urban status” (Wu and 
Treiman 2004: 363). The classification is based on a person‟s geographical location (urban or 
rural) and on the person‟s socioeconomic status (agricultural or non-agricultural). Each citizen 
is obliged to register in one, and only one, place of residency. This local hukou determines a 
person‟s right to a range of benefits and welfare services in a specific location (Chan and 
Buckingham 2008: 588). The hukou system is very much a birth-subscribed system and until 
recently hukou status was only inherited from ones mother (Chang and Zhang 1999: 822). It 
was, and still is today, very hard to change one‟s hukou status. In the earlier version of the 
regulations regarding hukou from 1951, only the cities had been included, whereas the 1955 
version the countryside was embraced as well. The year before, the responsibility for the 
administration and control of population movement had been given to the police force (Cheng 
and Selden 1994: 654). Writes Chan and Zhang (1999: 818-819) about this system:  
Unlike population registration systems in many other countries, the Chinese system was 
designed not merely to provide population statistics and identify personal status, but also 
directly to regulate population distribution and serve many other important objectives 
desired by the state. In fact, the hukou system is one of the major tools of social control 
employed by the state. Its functions go far beyond simply controlling population mobility. 
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With this regulation, all in-fluxes of people into the cities were controlled by the state and all 
movement within the rural area, and the cities as well, was regulated. It became much more 
complicated to move, and permits were required even for moving within one‟s own township 
(Cheng and Selden 1994: 656). Two other administrative institutions were crucial for the 
effectiveness of the hukou system in restricting the internal migration; the communes and the 
danwei. In the countryside the collective communes were the basic unit in which people 
worked and lived. They enabled the local government to tie the farmers to the land. In the 
urban areas, the danwei was the workplace organization that provided the workers with social 
services such as medical care, housing and child care. Without it, it was hard for people to 
survive in the cities. This “…tight administrative control on both sides virtually eliminated 
unauthorized rural-to-urban migration in the prereform era” (Wu and Treiman 2004: 364). 
The registration processes were closely associated with the grain rationing mentioned above. 
All individuals registered in a household were classified in resident committees, work units, 
schools etc. Lists with the names of these persons, in addition to hukou cards, were sent to the 
local government, where grain-supply cards were issued. The cards had to be taken to the 
local grain stores where they could be exchanged for grain tickets that then had to be 
presented at restaurants and other places in order to get the desired products. Every time the 
number of family members changed through marriage, birth, death etc, this had to be reported 
in order for the grain supply to be increased or decreased accordingly. In this way, the hukou 
registration and the grain rationing were highly related, and there was a remarkable 
differentiation made between urban and rural residents (ibid: 658).  
In 1958, the final version of the hukou law that was to become nationwide was publicized, 
with Chairman Mao‟s signature; Regulations on Household Registration in the People’s 
Republic of China (Wang 2005: 45). Now, the state had even more power to control the 
population movement, through “…a system of migration permits and recruitment and 
enrolment certificates” (Chan and Zhang 1999: 820). This regulation is the version of the 
hukou system that is still in place in today‟s China. In this version, every citizen of China was 
included in the registration system and it became extremely tough to get a permit for moving 
or to change one‟s hukou status; “Neither employment hopes nor the desire to reunite families 
constituted acceptable reasons for migration” (Cheng and Selden 1994: 664). A person 
lacking an urban employment or school certificate had to get hold of a moving-in certificate 
issued by the police in the city of destination. Holding this, one could then apply for a 
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moving-out certificate at the police station in one‟s home town or village. While there had 
previously been no problem to get the latter certificate, after 1958 the local authorities would 
not let anyone leave the rural area without a moving-in certificate (ibid. 663). In the 1958 
regulation, urban residents were registered according to a household classification, while the 
rural residents were registered within the commune; “The regulations explicitly linked hukou 
status with collective membership for rural residents” (ibid). The problem of growing gaps 
between the cities and the countryside was still not a part of the official discussion, and the 
state continued to invest capital and other resources in the cities, leaving the countryside 
behind. The successfully restricted migration in the 1950‟s was, according to Cheng and 
Selden, an effective combination of the tightened hukou system, controls regarding the 
collectives, emigration programs focusing on transfer of people from big cities to smaller 
towns and villages, food rationing and restricted travelling (ibid. 662). However, while the 
state tried to further sharpen the conditions for travels and movement in 1958, the internal 
migration actually grew even bigger. This has to do with the Great Leap Forward (GLF), and 
the fact that the state was more occupied with developing and industrializing the nation, and 
that many of the new harsh regulations issued were often simply ignored by enterprises 
looking to recruit new employees. Companies desperately needed workforce for their 
factories and other places of work in order to meet the expectations of the new 
industrialization. In 1958 alone, some 38 million people were reported to be leaving the 
countryside for the cities. Furthermore, in the chaos caused by the GLF (when tens of millions 
of people died as a result of famine due to the state‟s unbalanced and inconsiderate 
concentration on rapid industrialization and unstable development), administrative control 
was temporarily broken down and this of course made it more difficult for the state to control 
migration. Between 1958 and 1960, therefore, millions of people once again rushed into the 
cities in search of jobs and money – the greatest population movement seen in China at that 
point in history. When the disastrous results of the GLF became clear to the government, it 
responded by once again implementing full-fledged hukou, in order to reduce the urban 
population. The distinction between city and village became clear once more, and during the 
next two decades rural-urban migration was nearly completely closed by the state. Through 
the hukou system, the state now “…exercised iron control over residential and work patterns 
throughout city and countryside” (ibid. 664-665).  
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The hukou system turned out to be an effective tool for the state to control its population, 
especially after 1960. People were tied to their place of birth (or, to the birthplace of their 
husbands in the case of women) and their freedom of movement was highly restricted. Hence, 
people were forbidden to move to a different place of choice within their own country. This 
made a move on the social hierarchy principally impossible as well. Very few people could 
climb up that ladder, even though some were allowed to climb down. As already mentioned, 
the hukou system was severely weakened during the GLF when people could move around 
relatively free. The result was that, by 1963, close to 20 million state employees and about 26 
and 28 million urban hukou holders had been transported back to the countryside. The 
remaining urban population became an even more privileged group, even though they are a 
minority in China. The rest of the population, the majority, has prevailed in the countryside. 
Writes Wang (2005: 47) about this division: 
The majority of the Chinese people, in the rural areas, have all been designated 
“agricultural population” regardless of what they do for a living. Ranging from 73 to 88 
percent of the total population, they constitute the institutionally excluded in China under 
the PRC hukou system, economically, politically, socially, and culturally. 
The system has not been completely unchallenged, though. During the Cultural Revolution 
1966-1976, the hukou system was threatened. The Red Guards, especially the angry peasants 
living and working in the cities but holding only a temporary hukou, partly crushed the hukou 
system. Much of the hukou registration was destroyed and the angry temporary hukou holders 
in the cities became permanent urban residents. The system was, however, soon reinstalled 
again; “The hukou system‟s functions of social control and institutional exclusion were 
maintained and even further rigidified afterwards” (Wang 2005: 47). During the two 
following decades, the hukou system held the Chinese population in a firm grip, not allowing 
any labor mobility or urbanization and tying the workers to their danweis and communes. The 
gap between the countryside and the urban areas grew deeper in terms of, for instance, income 
and living standards. There were a few things that a person holding a rural hukou could do to 
change it and these included obtaining a college education “through politically determined 
selection”, joining the military and becoming an officer or following a set of special marriage 
arrangements (ibid. 48). During the Cultural Revolution an attempt by the state to narrow the 
gap between the urban and rural areas was initiated. Millions of young students were sent to 
the countryside, to “be reeducated by the peasants” (ibid). They had to give up their privileged 
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urban hukou and go to the villages to work and live with the peasants in a campaign that also 
ended in disaster as all these youngsters were taken out of school, missed years of education 
and were separated from their families. Many of them took matters in their own hands and 
returned home illegally, but the majority were only allowed to go home after demonstrations 
and protests in 1979 (Mallee 2000: 88).  
Despite its efforts, during the 1960‟s onwards, the state still seemed to struggle with the 
growing urban population and the measures taken only further deepened the division between 
the urban and the rural. The urban hukou status was, not surprisingly, very attractive and 
many people desired to achieve it. According to Cheng and Selden (1994: 667), “[t]he 
Chinese state established two hierarchies for income, housing, grain rations, education, 
medical and other services…employment and retirement. In every sphere, the city was 
privileged over the countryside, and state sector workers over collective farmers”. Alongside 
these differentiations, there were also gaps within the different classifications. Hence, bigger 
cities were privileged over smaller ones and so on (ibid). The hukou system, thus, continued 
to be the main state institution controlling population movement, preventing rapid 
urbanization and deciding people‟s life opportunities, through the 1960‟s and 1970‟s until the 
reform period began in 1978.  
 
6.3 The Hukou System 1978-today 
 
Mao Zedong died in 1976 and soon afterwards the so called “Gang of Four”, with Mao‟s 
widow Jiang Qing as one of its members, was captured and its members put on trial. After 
having ruled for a short time, Mao‟s designated successor Hua Guofeng was removed from 
power. The Chinese reform period began in 1978 after Deng Xiaoping had gained power over 
the nation and started his reform politics that were to completely transform China into a more 
open country, a huge producer of goods and a crucial player on the international market. The 
hukou system was to be transformed as well, and these changes were closely connected to the 
changes in the other fields such as the market-oriented economic reform, political 
decentralization and pressure from the marginalized rural population. The decollectivization 
starting in 1978 released millions of people previously tied to the land of their villages. The 
nation was set on market economy and in order to become a socialist market economy, the 
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workforce had to be increased (Wang 2005: 49-50). In 1981, the state encouraged urban 
enterprises to start employing people holding agricultural hukou. According to Mallee, the 
reason for this is clear; employing low-wage rural workers was a good deal for both the 
enterprises and the workers. Industries such as mining and construction, which had had a hard 
time finding urban laborers, benefitted tremendously from this. The migrant workers were 
much cheaper to employ, not only because their salaries were lower than the urban workers‟; 
they also did not receive the welfare package that official state workers were provided with. 
The government‟s attitude toward migrant workers gradually changed due to the enterprises‟ 
preference for employing these people (Mallee 2000: 89).  
In 1983, an important reform in the hukou system was implemented. It was called “self-
supplied grain household” (zili kouliang hukou) and meant that peasants were permitted to 
transfer their hukou to market towns as long as they could find employment, uphold a stable 
residence and handle their own food rations (Wong and Wai-Po 1998: 975-976). Two years 
later, in 1985, another important reform was initiated; Provisional Regulations on the 
Management of the Temporary Residents in Cities and Towns. According to these regulations, 
everyone staying or living outside of their permanent place of registration for more than three 
days are required to get a temporary hukou permit. Anyone who moves to a new place needs 
to register at the local police station within three days of arrival. When the person registered 
leaves that place, the permit should be cancelled. Starting from 2001, all hotels and inns with 
more than fifty beds are obliged to have a computer system directly linked to the local police 
in order to instantaneously report guests‟ personal information and scan their photos (Wang 
2005: 73-74). The 1985 regulations legalized the floating population and officially made it 
legal for people to live outside their permanent registered location (Wong and Wai-Po 1998: 
976). These reforms are very important, since it opened up for the massive rural-urban 
migration that has taken place ever since. The number of liudong renkou (floating population) 
today accounts to somewhere between 120 and 210 million people.  
In 1985, yet another reform was put into practice; Regulations on Resident Identity Card in 
the People’s Republic of China. All citizens over the age of 16 are required to carry with them 
an identity card and be prepared for inspection by the police. This allowed the state to better 
monitor the population. The people are now no longer collectively registered, but individually 
which gives them greater mobility. The card has “a national serial number, personal 
information, and the hukou location of its holder, but without the discriminatory, insulting 
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reference to hukou categorization” (Wang 2005: 52). The identity card is a must for the 
Chinese people in their daily life. Without it basic things like marriage arrangements, voting, 
military service, school enrollment, booking flight tickets, remitting money, applying for 
social services etc, are impossible (Wong and Wai-Po 1998: 976). In the late 1980‟s, a new 
kind of hukou was introduced. This transitional hukou “has a status between temporary 
residency and permanent household registration” (ibid. 977). This hukou is called “green 
card”, “blue card”, “blue chop household registration” or “blue-seal hukou”, depending on 
locality. The blue-seal hukou means that the holder has the same rights and status as the 
permanent local population, and he or she also has an opportunity to obtain permanent hukou 
after five years of qualified residency (Wang 2005: 51). In order to qualify for a blue-seal 
hukou, the applicant must have skills that the concerned department finds necessary and also 
pay a fee of 5,000 yuan. This system became so popular that the population of small towns 
grew rapidly within just a few years. In 1994, the system was introduced in Shanghai and, in 
1996, in Shenzhen. The purpose of the blue-seal system in Shanghai was to “attract capital 
and people of caliber into the megacity” and the requirements to be fulfilled in order to get a 
blue-seal hukou here are much higher than in towns and smaller cities (Wong and Wai-Po 
1998: 978).  
The state abolished its grain monopoly in 1985 and the food rationings in the cities began to 
disappear in 1987. Urban employment, housing and public facilities became more accessible 
to outsiders as well, even migrant workers. However, writes Wang (2005: 51), “[t]he hukou 
system‟s discriminatory role in resource allocation…remains significant in areas like 
education, especially higher education”. In 1988, the local governments in Lalian county and 
Quanjiao county of Anhui province started experimenting with selling urban permanent 
hukou. In exchange for a fee, peasants who desperately wanted to change their rural hukou to 
an urban one could do so. Within a few years most counties provided this service, with the 
price ranging from a few thousand yuan to several tens of thousands. This system, naturally, 
benefitted the richest peasants who could pay the price for an urban hukou, while it made no 
significant difference to the great majority of the peasant population (Wong and Wai-Po 1998: 
977). The practice of buying a hukou did, however, become so widespread that the Ministry 
of Public Security in 1992 had to issue an order that firmly prohibited the practice. Some 
officials even lost their jobs and were brought to trial because they had been changing 
people‟s hukou statuses in exchange for fees (Mallee 2000: 93). The practice of selling hukou 
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did not reform the registration system, but rather added to the dichotomy between the urban 
and rural areas and simply strengthened the already existing differences (Wong and Wai-Po 
1998: 977). In 1998, yet another important change of the hukou rules was initiated. From now 
on, children could inherit their father‟s or their mother‟s hukou status, which made rural-
urban or cross-regional marriage very convenient for migration, at least for the next 
generation (Wang 2005: 52).  
As we have seen, the hukou system in China has gone through a great deal of reforms since 
the reform period started in 1978. After the death of Mao Zedong and the coming to power of 
Deng Xiaoping, the nation has gone through one of the biggest transformations of all times. 
The transition to a market economy demanded a significant number of cheap laborers and the 
state began to see the migrants as a profitable means in the quest for development. The 
rigidity of the hukou system was loosened to some degree through the many reforms initiated. 
The perhaps most important one was the temporary hukou permit implemented in 1985. This 
reform legalized the floating population and opened up for the massive migration we see in 
China today. Despite all of the reforms, the hukou system seems to still be discriminatory, and 
the dichotomy between the urban and rural population still prevails today.  
As the migration politics and the hukou administration became more liberal and less rigid, 
more and more people moved to the cities and the urban share of the population grew rapidly. 
Wang points out, however, that the CCP government has been afraid to lose the hukou system 
as a politically useful institution of exclusion and social control, and that it tried to sharpen the 
conditions for the hukou system several times during the 1980‟ and 1990‟s. For instance, the 
hukou authority has been centralized and some unauthorized changes of rural hukou to urban 
hukou have been stopped. In 1988, Beijing ordered that more than two million workers whose 
papers were not authorized be fired from their work and sent back to the countryside. The 
year after, the central government ordered local governments to better control transfers of 
hukou statuses which led to a reduction of such transfers by over a million cases in two years. 
This toughening of the rules regarding hukou often was a result of the failure of softer 
policies. After a year or two, however, these sharpening of the rules usually disappeared 
(Wang 2005: 52). As we can see, the hukou system is still prevalent in the Chinese society 
today. Even though reforms have been made to make the hukou system better suited for the 
conditions of a market economy and developed nation, the state still uses it to control the 
mobility of the population. The division between countryside and urban areas is clearly as 
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present in the 2000‟s as it was in previous decades. The countryside continues to be several 
steps behind the cities and the population there is marginalized in comparison to the urban 
inhabitants. In their “China Human Development Report” (2005) the United Nations is 
discussing the unequal living conditions for the urban and rural population. According to this 
report, “The average social security expenditure per capita in urban areas is 10 times that of 
rural areas. Thus, the social security premiums of urban employees are continuously 
increasing, while rural migrant workers, employees of township enterprises, and farmers – 
who represent the majority of Chinese labor – are virtually excluded from the system” (UNDP 
2005: 62). The migrant workers are the worst off. The report shows that many work extremely 
long hours in hard and sometimes dangerous workplaces, are paid the lowest wages, are not 
covered by any insurance and have the lowest living standards (ibid. 87). We can thus see that 
the hukou system still matters today and that, despite the changes initiated, many people still 
suffer from this system. The hierarchy within the nation is clear, with the urban population 
being well off in comparison to both the rural population and the migrant workers residing in 
the cities. The system is “…a major source of injustice and inequality, perhaps the most 
crucial foundation of China‟s social and spatial stratification, and arguably contributes to the 
country‟s most prevalent human rights violations” (Chan and Buckingham 2008: 583). There 
does not seem to be an abolition of the hukou system in sight in the near future.  
To conclude this rather short summary of the history of the hukou system, we can see how it 
has been developed in order to achieve controlled development in China. Through the hukou 
system, the PRC government has managed to include certain groups into the privileged 
societal stratum, while at the same time exclude those not wanted within it. By privileging the 
urban areas over the rural ones, the state has now created a pool of a cheap, surplus work 
force that can be used at any time. The labor needed to build China‟s new economy is there to 
be taken advantage of, without the state having to take any real responsibility for its 
wellbeing. The hukou system is clearly a key factor influencing Chinese internal migration. 
Rather than initiating an abolition of the hukou system, the government has made sure it has 
been “…reformed and made more flexible to serve the new need to reregulate peasants on the 
move” (Zhang 2001: 23). The effects the hukou system has on the Chinese society will be 
discussed in the following. 
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7.  Effects of the hukou system 
 
From the description of the various types of migration and the historical account of the 
development of the hukou system, we can conclude that the hukou system is a crucial 
institutional arrangement which helps the authorities to monitor and control population 
movement and –distribution. Economic migration is usually a result of insufficient income 
levels in the countryside, and the rural populations‟ disadvantage of having rural hukou. Due 
to their hukou status these migrants are excluded from certain job sectors and are usually 
employed in low-waged and sometimes dangerous jobs. In an attempt of avoiding this 
scenario, many potential migrants consult their social networks before deciding to move. 
Knowing someone in the place of destination is a security meaning that one can receive help 
in arranging employment and housing. Since the state does not provide the migrants with 
these things, they are highly dependent on their families and friends. Marriage migration 
could work as a way of upwards social movement for many women. For many women 
holding rural hukou, and without many chances of improving their life situations, marriage 
migration can be an opportunity for escaping their poor homes. However, the rural hukou 
holders are not particularly attractive on the national marriage market, and many are restricted 
to moving within the rural areas. Thus, the hukou system affects marriage migration as well. 
In this chapter, I will investigate more in-depth the hukou system‟s effects on the lives of the 
migrants and the society as a whole. These factors are important since they highlight an 
essential part of the hukou system, i.e. the way the system influences the lives of the people 
living under it and the greater societal structures as well. Since every Chinese citizen is 
“…politically and socially, if not completely economically, stratified and governed according 
to his hukou type and location on a near-permanent basis by the government” (Wang 2005: 
147), it is interesting to see how this stratification influences people‟s daily life as well the 
aspects of integration and access to benefits and services. In China, it is practically impossible 
to discuss regional differences and relationships between social groups as two separate 
phenomena. Under the hukou system, there are not only vertical class differences between 
people, but horizontal spatial differences as well. Discrimination in China is to a great extent 
based on the horizontal stratification created by the hukou system, dividing people into 
different socioeconomic spheres depending on where one resides or was born. Therefore, 
people are extremely connected to location and the conditions presiding there. In this chapter, 
I focus on the discriminatory effects caused by the hukou system and the state‟s migrant labor 
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regime in order to demonstrate the full scope of the effects that the registration system in 
China can pose on the population. More specifically I will focus on regional differences such 
as income differences, unequal distribution of resources and public services, the access to 
education and the segmentation of the labor market in order to show how the state (through 
the hukou system) divides the population into unequal groups and thereby keeps the great 
rural surplus of cheap labor intact.The chart below illustrates how differences in income and 
access to social welfare benefits are distributed among people who hold urban hukou and 
rural hukou respectively. The group holding rural hukou has been divided into two subgroups, 
illustrating the differences between the local rural population and the migrating population. 
The sources of the information provided in the chart will be referenced in the text below. The 
function of the data in the chart is to give the reader a rough idea about the situation, and not 
as an absolute truth. 
 Urban hukou holders 
in urban areas 
Rural hukou holders in 
rural areas 
Migrant workers (rural hukou) not 
registered at place of current 
residency 
Annual per capita 
income  
11,802 – 4,745 yuan 
(year 2000) 
5,596 – 1,331 yuan (year 
2000) 
Approximately 7500 yuan (year 
2002)
1
 
Access to pension Accessible – 70% Limited access – 3% No access in current location 
Access to 
unemployment 
insurance 
Accessible Reliable information not 
found 
No access in current location 
Access to medical 
insurance (year 2003) 
Fairly accessible – 
40% 
Limited access – 21% No access in current location 
Access to education Accessible Accessible Limited access in current location 
Types of employment 
accessible  
All sectors including 
white collar jobs and 
state employment. 
Agriculture. Township 
enterprises. 
Manual work. 3D jobs. 
                                                          
1
Shi 2008: 12. Exchange rates found at URL: http://www.smidigt.se/valutaomvandlare/ Access 2009-05-19. 
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7.1 The Hukou System as a Political Tool 
 
Before we go into more detail about these matters of the effects of the hukou system, 
however, I want to discuss how the hukou system is contributing to the political stability of 
China. The system, as we know, has been a strategic instrument used by the Chinese 
leadership since the 1950‟s to monitor and control movement, settlement and access to 
resources. The government has arranged so that people are spatially segregated and that 
power is kept within the party and the urban elite. The hukou system has allowed the 
leadership to easily rule and control the population and the authoritarian state has been able to 
continue this work without much interference. Wang writes: 
The hukou system has enabled a political structure in the PRC that is completely 
dominated by the urban residents, who have never been more than 26 percent of the 
population. In the mid-1990s, over 10 percent of urban hukou holders were CCP 
members, whereas less than 2 percent of ruralites were among the estimated fifty million 
party members (Wang 2005: 115). 
Practically every political CCP leader, at all levels in the political hierarchy, since the 1960‟s 
have been urban hukou holders. The rural hukou holders, who constitute the great majority of 
the population, have been virtually absent from any political representation in Beijing or at 
provincial and prefectural levels. Further down in the political hierarchy, there can be found 
some representatives holding rural hukou. However, writes Wang, these are hired by the state 
on a contractual basis and need to move back home as soon as the contract runs out. 
Simultaneously, they lose their benefits and salary as well as their temporary urban hukou. All 
higher military officers hold or are guaranteed urban hukou. All police officers hold urban 
hukou, except those assistants working in rural areas. All state employees hold urban hukou 
as well. Most highly educated people are likely to be urban hukou holders (ibid). In this way, 
the urban hukou holders form an elite which is highly influential and powerful in China‟s 
politics. The majority of the population is left behind, limited in many ways by its rural hukou 
and without many chances of upward class mobility. The political stability is also 
manipulated by the state when it comes to elections. The state makes sure that the urban 
minority elects the majority of all political deputies. Likewise, in the past four CCP People‟s 
Congresses, none of the members have been reported to have rural hukou (for more 
information about the political manipulation see Wang 2005: 115-117). This stable and 
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undemocratic political system is hence dependent on the hukou system, and has proven to be 
effective. Stability of this kind comes at the price of the rural population‟s political rights and 
the unevenly distribution of power. Also, adds Wang, the rural population is unlikely to 
protest against this undemocratic political system and to cause any serious political instability. 
This is doubtful since “this family-based agrarian population is much less concentrated, much 
less group-conscious, much less organized, and much less informed than the urban 
population” (ibid. 117). Wang, whose material has been used extensively in this thesis for 
describing and analyzing registration in China and its effects, is highly critical toward the 
hukou system. He writes that “[f]or a socialist PRC, the existence of such a complicated, 
comprehensive, rigid, highly entrenched social stratification, created and maintained by the 
people‟s government, is indeed one of the great ironies in human history” (Wang 2005: 135). 
Within this context, it is interesting to think about the prospects of any “real” democratic 
system developing in China in the future. The circumstances discussed above show that the 
current political system in China is very strong and stable and that without the great majority 
being able to speak up this does not seem very likely. It is not the focus of this thesis to 
discuss the prospects of democracy in China, for me it is only important to understand how 
the hukou system has contributed to the political stability in China under the CCP. In the 
following I will discuss the impact of the hukou system, both on people‟s daily lives and on 
the more general societal structures.  
 
7.2 The Hukou System’s Effects on Society and People 
7.2.1 Income Gaps and the Distribution of Investments 
 
One of the greatest evidence of the inequalities that the hukou system has contributed to is the 
income gap between urban and rural areas. Last year, 2008, China celebrated 30 years of 
opening up, reform politics and remarkable economic progress, but the inequalities in the 
country are still great and far from everyone can enjoy the fruits of the economic success. The 
urban-rural income gap is still big today. In a report published by the UNDP it is stated that in 
2007, “…the urban-rural income ratio in per capita income was 3.33 to 1. If distribution of 
spending on public services, including compulsory education, basic medical care and others 
are taken into account, the ratio reaches 5-6 to 1” (UNDP 2007: 33). We can thus see how the 
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inequalities that China has faced throughout its existence still prevail today. The dual 
economy, which is a result of the hukou system and an uneven distribution of resources and 
state investments, continues to thrive and cause significant regional discrepancies. State 
investment in development and research has been extremely unevenly distributed over the 
different provinces, writes Wang (2005). In 1994, six provinces received 54 percent of the 
funding aimed at these causes. In 1996, Shanghai had the highest per capita state investment, 
2,348 yuan, to be compared to Henan which received the lowest per capita investment from 
the government – 278 yuan. The big metropolises keep receiving the highest rates of foreign 
investment as well; by 1998, 88 percent of all foreign investment in China was concentrated 
in the eastern and coastal areas. Furthermore, in 2000 the eastern provinces‟ share in the 
national GDP was as high as 67.98 percent. This area is composed of 36.7 percent of the total 
population, 10.7 percent of the land but as much as 60.1 percent of all urban hukou holders. 
By comparison, the western area‟s share of the GDP was in 2000 only 13.1 percent (Wang 
2005: 128). These numbers say a great deal about the differences among China‟s provinces 
and regions, and serve as a clear motivation for people‟s desperate desire to move to the more 
prosperous areas.  There is also a great difference between urban hukou holders and rural 
hukou holders when it comes to income. In 2000, the highest annual per capita income among 
urban hukou holders was 11,802 yuan (in Shanghai) and the lowest was 4,745 yuan (in 
Shanxi). Comparatively, rural hukou holders‟ highest per capita annual income that year was 
5,596 yuan (in Shanghai) and the lowest was 1,331 (in Tibet) (ibid: 130). In 2002, the average 
monthly income for migrant workers holding rural hukou was approximately $100 (Shi 2008: 
12), which equals an annual average income per capita of about 7,500 yuan with today‟s 
exchange rates. A commonly used tool to measure inequalities in a country is the Gini 
coefficient. The Gini coefficient has a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 means perfect equality and 1 
means absolute inequality. Hence, “[t]he higher the value of the coefficient, the higher the 
inequality of income distribution…” and vice versa (Todero and Smith 2006: 814). In 2002 
the Gini coefficient for China was 0.45, a very high value indeed, illustrating the great 
inequalities in the country (UNDP 2005: 30). Wang finds all these great differences in income 
and investment directly connected to the hukou system: “Rural residents on average make 
only a third of urban income, and some actually earn less than 20 percent. The impetus for the 
ruralites to flow to the cities appears to be strong and lasting. Simultaneously, for the 
urbanites, the need to keep hukou-based migration restriction in place also appears to be 
imperative” (ibid).  
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As we can see, the income levels in China are related to the hukou system. In the urban areas, 
where the majority of the urban hukou holders reside, the income levels are higher than in the 
rural areas where practically everyone holds rural hukou status. This makes people move to 
the cities with hopes of getting better wages and perhaps become urban hukou holders. In 
addition, the rural labor surplus forces a great deal of people to seek employment in the 
eastern and coastal areas. The state investments are also unequally distributed over the 
country. The prosperous eastern and coastal areas receive the great majority of this money, as 
well as the foreign investment. These differences in wages, income and investment clearly 
illustrate the large regional gaps existing in China today, and we have also seen how this gap 
is related to the hukou system. However, not only income and investments are unequally 
dispersed across the Chinese provinces. 
 
7.2.2 Access to Welfare Benefits and Social Services 
 
 Welfare benefits are extremely unevenly distributed among the population as well. As the 
economy is growing and China is transforming into a more developed country, the 
government should now work hard and strenuous in order to be able to provide public 
services and benefits, such as pension, unemployment insurance and medical insurance to the 
whole population. However, the hukou system is still offering and taking away these services 
to people depending on their place of residency.  
I will start by looking at the pensions system in China. In order to get a pension, men need to 
be 60 years old and women 55 years old and have to have paid 15 years of individual 
premiums. However, the rural population residing in the countryside in reality has no 
retirement age at all (Leung 2003: 76). All workers employed by the state and all self-
employed receive pensions, meaning that the system covers practically all urban workers. 
According to the Human Development Report by UNDP, by the year 2000 the pension system 
covered 70 percent of the urban elderly while only 3 percent of the rural elderly were covered. 
Nationwide, there was a clear gender division, with men being covered by the system to a 
much greater extent than women (UNDP 2005: 63).  Furthermore, the report shows, there is a 
significant inequality in the amount of money distributed through the pensions in the rural and 
urban areas respectively. In the cities, the average amount available to the pension receivers is 
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20 percent higher than that in rural areas. Even within the areas great differences exist. In the 
urban areas, urban hukou holders receive 110 percent more in pension than those living there 
but holding rural hukou (ibid). Overall, the Chinese old-age pension system is far from 
perfect. Family is still the most important source of support for China‟s elderly. According to 
Salditt et al (2008: 57), approximately 45 percent of all elderly in the country live with an 
adult child and roughly 90 percent of the Chinese are willing to support their parents 
financially. Salditt et al also state that there are reforms taking place in China concerning the 
pension system. However, at this point the government‟s first priority is, perhaps not 
surprisingly, to establish a running old-age support system in the urban areas whereas there is 
no “financial provision” for the rural elderly (ibid).  
The pension system in China seems to be taking the same road as the income levels. The 
hukou status decides to a great extent whether an elderly receives financial old-age support or 
not. The dualistic economy once again affects the rural hukou holders negatively, as they miss 
out on a lot of the benefits provided to the urban population. According to UNDP, the 
unemployment insurance is equally unevenly distributed among the population. Currently, all 
urban enterprises and urban workers are covered by this insurance. Migrant workers in the 
cities, however, are not covered even though they are the ones most likely to be unemployed. 
The UNDP report states that “current regulations do not require enterprises to pay for 
unemployment insurance for rural migrant workers. While official data are not available, 
surveys show rural migrants are largely bypassed by the system” (UNDP 2005: 65). Medical 
insurance is another social service which includes a limited part of the Chinese population. In 
2003, about 55 percent of the urban workforce was covered by it. Comparatively, in rural 
areas only about 21 percent was covered (ibid. 66). The costs for medical insurance are shared 
by the government, the employer and the employee. Since the wages in the countryside are 
significantly lower than in the cities, as noted above, the proportion of expenses for medical 
insurance to the rural workers‟ income is considerably higher here. Peasant migrants in the 
cities lack medical insurance all together. In 2008, the government initiated an annual 
allowance aimed at financially support disabled children in Beijing. Starting in January this 
year, all disabled children in the city will be given an annual allowance of 1000 yuan. The 
migrant children are, however, not included in the program. Man Xiaobing, a twenty-seven-
year-old migrant worker whose three-year-old daughter is deaf, thinks this is unfair, saying 
“It‟s good news, but only for Beijingers…Even though we don‟t have Beijing hukou we 
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should still have the same rights as Beijing residents” (China Daily 2008-12-04). Since 2002, 
however, there has been some improvement concerning the medical insurance coverage 
nationwide. That year, the government implemented a publicly funded medical insurance, and 
“the State Council introduced rural cooperative medicare and increased support for medical 
insurance for serious diseases” (UNDP 2005: 66). Despite this effort, the differences between 
the cities and the urban areas are still big. The measure has been fully implemented in the 
urban areas, and covers all categories of urban workers. In the countryside, on the other hand, 
the measure is only just being experimented with (ibid). There are still significant shortages in 
professional medical staff, technological equipments and appropriate facilities in the 
countryside. Many rural people are still not covered by the medical insurance system and 
there is a lack of medicine and medical care (Dib et.al 2008: 2).  
In China, the safety net of social services and welfare benefits is far from completed. Many 
citizens face hard times in the case of unemployment, lay-offs, old age or disease and 
disability. However, at the moment, the urban hukou holders are far better covered by the 
social security net provided by the government than the rural hukou holders. Even though the 
subject needs further research, it is quite clear that the rural population and the migrant 
population holding rural hukou is to a large extent excluded from this kind of welfare services 
provided by the state.  
 
7.2.3 Access to Education 
 
Wages, pensions and insurances are but three examples of the way the hukou system is 
discriminating the rural population. Access to education is also highly dependent on which 
hukou status one has. The greatest difference in access to education seems to be that between 
local hukou holders and the migrants living outside of their registered residency. The matter 
of education offered to migrant children has been much debated in China in recent years (see 
for instance China Daily 2004-08-26 and Xinhuanet 2007-05-21). As more adult migrants 
now tend to stay longer in the cities than before, they are more willing to bring their families 
along, thus creating a big group of migrant school-aged children in the places of destination. 
The requirements for a child to be enrolled in an urban school are, firstly, that the child lives 
in the local school district and, secondly, that the child also is registered within that district 
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(Liang and Chen 2007: 30).  Children of migrants are less likely to be enrolled in a local 
school since their parents have to pay a much larger enrollment fee than do the local urban 
population. Given the fact that the majority of the floating population consists of low-skilled 
and low-waged workers, the fees requested are often too big for the parents to pay. For 
elementary school, the enrollment fee is 2000 yuan, whereas the fee for high school is 50,000 
yuan per year (ibid). Fan (2008: 114) quotes a migrant working in Guangdong, saying “Will I 
be staying in Guangdong for good? Absolutely not. We don‟t have [local] hukou here, which 
makes life very difficult. My children will be going to school soon. Without a hukou in 
Guangzhou we cannot afford sending them to school here”. Many of the migrants, thus, return 
to the countryside when their children are old enough to go to school. Some urban schools 
simply refuse to take in migrant children altogether. In order to provide education for these 
migrant children, a new phenomenon of migrants schools (i.e. schools enrolling only migrant 
children) have emerged in cities like Beijing and Shanghai. These schools are run by migrants 
themselves, and according to Fan (2008: 127) there were approximately 280 such schools in 
Beijing in 2004. These schools provided education for about 50,000 migrant children residing 
in the city – which constituted only one-fifth of all school-aged migrant children there. The 
standard of the schools is, however, low. A typical migrant school in the city is characterized 
by “…delayed age at school enrollment, low socioeconomic background of parents, high 
mobility among students, and problems with teacher qualification and school infrastructure” 
(Liang and Chen 2007: 31). Despite these problems, the migrant schools demonstrate the high 
degree of organization that exists among the migrants. This is yet another sign pointing to the 
fact that the migrants are not “blind drifters”, moving around uncontrollably, but that they 
actually are relatively organized and structured.  
Difficulties with paying enrollment fees and inability to provide education for their children 
are common motives for the migrants to return home after a few years in the cities. This is by 
many considered a better option, according to Fan (2008: 127). Liang and Chen (2007:35), in 
their case study of school enrollment among children in Guangdong province, conclude that 
“…permanent migrant children have the highest rate of school enrollment, followed by local 
children in cities, and temporary migrant children”. That permanent migrant children have the 
highest rate is explained by the socioeconomic profile of their families. Many of them are for 
instance state employees and their children tend to be enrolled in school. As we can see, 
hukou plays a significant role when it comes to the available education for Chinese citizens 
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and their children. However, there are also other aspects affecting whether or not migrant 
children are going to school. The duration of the stay in the city is, for instance, of 
considerable importance when looking at the educational level among migrants. Liang and 
Chen (2007) found that the longer the migrants (both permanent and temporary) stay in the 
cities, the more likely are their children enrolled in school.  
Hukou status is thus important for the education available to Chinese children, and 
particularly plays an important role for migrant children. However, the significance of hukou 
is also present at higher levels of education. College and university admission is likewise 
highly affected by the hukou system. Higher education during the PRC has been the main 
entrance into socioeconomic and political upwards mobility. To get a college degree is the 
most important hope for those few in the backwards and undeveloped areas who are talented 
and lucky enough, to legally change their hukou status from agricultural to non-agricultural. 
Only by achieving this can they resettle in the cities and increase their opportunities to good 
employment and comfortable living for themselves and their families. Writes Wang (2005: 
139):  
By passing the examination in subjects decided on and graded by the state and then 
managing to graduate from a state-accredited college – all are still state-run in the 2000s – 
anyone can acquire an urban hukou…Furthermore, although since the late 1990s college 
graduates have no longer been guaranteed state jobs, college education still is the key to 
economic and social advancement in a nation filled with hundreds of millions of low-
skilled and unskilled laborers. 
In the beginning of the 2000‟s, the Chinese colleges were enrolling between one and one and 
a half million students annually. In 2004, for the first time, the number of enrolled students 
holding rural hukou was bigger than those holding urban hukou. The entrance tests are 
considered to be fair and equal for everyone in the Chinese society, with blind grading, 
computerized selection for admission and so on (Wang 2005: 140). Despite this seemingly 
fair way of conducting enrollment and admission, the hukou system still makes the college 
system discriminating against rural hukou holders. Every citizen hoping to get admitted is 
obliged to do the entrance tests at colleges located in their place of registration, regardless of 
where in the country they live at the present time. All provinces, metropolises and regions 
have their own quotas for college admission and the number of applicants varies greatly. 
According to Wang, the number of applicants or student performance in one particular 
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province does not decide who is accepted into college; rather, it is the location of the colleges 
and state directives that decide. The distribution of the colleges makes it hard for the rural 
population to be enrolled in a college program; “[in] 2001, there were about fifty thousand 
college applicants but over a hundred colleges in Beijing; in nearby Shandong Province, there 
were four hundred thousand college applicants but fewer than fifty colleges” (ibid. 141). The 
universities are obliged to admit a certain number of students from areas outside where the 
university is located. These numbers are, however, extremely low considering the number of 
applicants. Wang gives an example: the top university Tsinghua University was obliged to 
enroll 600 out of 60,000 applicants from Beijing every year between 1998 and 2001, whereas 
the number of admitted applicants from Shandong Province was 100 out of 300,000 (ibid. 
143). This, in combination with the fact that most top universities in China are located in the 
metropolises, makes it harder for a person holding a rural hukou to be accepted to a college 
and receive a prestigious education. According to Wang, there are even more evidence of 
discrimination within the college admission process. For instance, the minimum admission 
score for getting accepted at universities outside the metropolises are higher than in Beijing 
and other cities. In conclusion, it is apparently much easier to get admitted to the desired 
university – at any location – if one holds urban hukou. In addition to these admission rules, 
there are two more ways for the urban youngsters to get into college. Every year, the 
universities admit a few off-campus students. These students are not sponsored by the state, 
and do not hold subsidized housing on campus. They therefore need a place to live that is 
located outside of campus and have to be able to afford to support themselves during the 
semesters. In this way, “residents of the urban centers where most colleges are located have 
another chance to go to college, with admissions scores even lower than the published 
minimum” (ibid. 145). Another way for the more wealthy individuals to get into college is the 
self-paying admission. The government allows universities to admit a certain number of 
students that are outside of state mandate of planning. They must pay higher tuition fees and 
arrange their own housing, and are often admitted through significantly lower test scores. This 
way into college, by paying, is naturally only available to people in urban areas with a certain 
amount of money at their disposal (ibid). Based on the information provided by Wang, I think 
we can conclude that the Chinese college admission procedure is not as fair as one might 
think after a first look. The role of hukou status seems to be very much present in this process. 
To implement a national system could be one way to eliminate the favoring of students from 
the urban areas and give everyone a fair chance at being admitted. On the other hand, the 
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practice of paying to get into university might be a way for some people to get a second 
chance at education and can perhaps help the universities financially. According to Wang, 
there has been a great deal of criticism in China against the admission system. For instance, in 
2001 three college applicants in Shandong Province (which has the highest minimum scores 
for admission) sued the Chinese Ministry of Education. They all had very high test scores, 
well above the minimum scores needed for top universities in Beijing. However, being as they 
were registered in Shandong they could not get into any college at all (ibid. 147).  
 
7.2.4 The Labor Market 
 
The urban labor market, as noted above, is clearly segregated, with the migrants and the local 
urban workers employed in different sectors. I will now look more deeply into how the hukou 
has contributed in shaping this structure of segmentation. In China under the PRC, the state 
plays an important and strong role concerning most aspects of political, economical and even 
social spheres. Traditionally, the state has also had power to decide over labor and 
employment. Before the reform period, the urban labor force was employed in the state sector, 
more specifically in the so called SOEs (state owned enterprises). Here, as noted above, 
everyone belonged to a danwei (work unit) which provided the urban worker with everything 
he or she needed. This included housing, food rationing, child care etc. In the countryside, on 
the other hand, people were more or less forced to form communes, and live and work 
together in big collectives. In the reform period, when the communes were closed and the 
restrictions on movement were loosened, people have migrated on a massive scale as 
described in chapter 5. The creation of a free labor market opened up a range of job 
opportunities available to the Chinese population in the urban areas. Writes Fan (2002:107) 
about the transformation of the urban areas: “cities have begun to evolve from purely 
productive agents to becoming consuming entities characterized by consumerism, burgeoning 
markets, a division of labor, a thriving service sector, a growing middle class, and a more 
international and Western outlook”. The migrants are, however, not allowed to completely 
take part of this extreme transformation in the cities. Knight and Yueh (2009: 80) observe that 
“generally, migrants have been permitted only in the „residual‟ urban wage jobs not wanted 
by residents. These tend to be the lowest wage, lowest skill, least pleasant jobs. Nevertheless, 
migrant urban wage can greatly exceed (standardized) rural alternative incomes…”. While 
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most of the local urban population can choose more freely at the labor market, migrants are to 
a great extent given jobs in sectors with a lot of hard, manual work. The urban labor market is 
characterized by segmentation, as opposed to competition, between migrant workers and non-
migrant workers. Since they are employed in different sectors, they rarely compete for the 
same jobs, and their roles in the labor market seem to be rather complementary. The migrants 
often take the jobs rejected by the local urban population (ibid). In the 2000 census, 66 
percent of all temporary migrants were employed in industrial work, the most dominant sector 
employing migrants. Commerce and service followed, employing respectively 12.2 and 8.7 
percent of the migrants. Permanent migrants, who usually attain urban hukou, are much better 
represented in professional work (26.5 percent according to the 2000 census, to be compared 
with 6.9 percent of the temporary migrants) (Fan 2008: 101). Temporary migrants are, 
furthermore, more vulnerable on the labor market. Their salaries are more dependent on 
market forces, and they often lack the kind of information, contacts and alternatives (Knight 
and Yueh 2009: 81) needed in order to be competitive in the job searching process. Whereas 
the urban enterprises are more than willing to hire the cheap labor that migrants constitute, the 
urban local governments have restricted them from hiring as many of them as they would like. 
In order to protect the urban population and secure their employment, governments at 
different levels have imposed fees and controls on enterprises to make sure that they do not 
employ too many migrants at the expense of the local urban population (ibid). In a range of 
cities across China, there are sets of rules excluding migrant workers without urban hukou 
from jobs and occupations. Employers are forced to have a number of permits and 
bureaucratic papers in order to be able to hire migrant workers. Some cities have a list of jobs 
available to the local urban population, jobs available to the migrant work force and jobs 
available to both groups but still preferring the local urban workers. At places, the number of 
migrants that the enterprises were allowed to hire, was also dependent on the unemployment 
rates of the local urban population. Therefore, “it is to be expected…that migrant employment 
would be curtailed as a policy response to rising urban unemployment in China but would be 
relaxed as and when labor market conditions permitted” (ibid). In this way, the occupational 
stratification has been institutionalized (Nielsen et al. 2006: 43).  
Thus, the jobs available to the migrant workers are often dirty, dangerous and demeaning. 
They are highly overrepresented in this category of jobs, which the local urban population 
refuses to do. Additionally, when the migrants do work at the same working place as the local 
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urban work force, they seem to be paid less (Nielsen et al. 2006: 43). Knight and Yueh (2009: 
84) associate the situation at the Chinese urban labor market with a perspective of insider 
versus outsider. The insider, the local urban employee, and the outsider, the migrant worker, 
are employed in different parts of the labor market. If they are employed within the same 
segment, they are so on different terms. The insider has power over the wage setting 
procedure and is protected from competition. The outsider, on the other hand, is occupied in 
“bad” jobs with the salary, despite its dependency on market forces, pressed down under the 
level that would exist if the labor market had not been segmented (ibid). Fan (2008: 104) 
quotes a man commenting on the labor market situation: 
There isn‟t really a market for choosing jobs. Enterprises always prioritize recruiting 
employees with local hukou. We migrants don‟t have many options. Most of the jobs men 
can get via friends and relatives are in construction. It‟s as if there are no jobs other than 
construction. Last year I changed jobs twice. The only thing that hasn‟t changed is that 
wherever I went I did construction work. 
The hukou system and the segmentation of the labor market are thus closely interrelated. 
Many critics, who argue in favor of increased marketization, hold the belief that “hukou 
impedes the establishment and operation of a labor market, hinders efficient allocation of 
human resources, and in turn holds back marketization” (Fan 2008: 48). By hanging on to the 
hukou system, the state and employers risk losing potentially valuable staff for the enterprises, 
since it excludes people based on location instead of personality or appropriate qualifications. 
As previously noted, usually temporary migrants stay in the cities for less than a year, even 
though circular migration is common, i.e. that a migrant often move several times back and 
forth between the place of origin and the place of destination. The hukou system and the time-
specific employment in the cities probably have a lot to do with this. Many migrants work 
extremely hard within this segregated labor market that allows them to earn more money than 
at home but also treats them as inferior to the local urban population and does not provide 
them with a successful career. Furthermore, the urban labor market is uncertain, and a migrant 
can easily be laid off. Many of the temporary migrants dream of moving back home and start 
a business of their own, thus escaping the segmented urban labor market, the often hard 
working conditions and becoming more self-dependent. Aiguo, a migrant worker in Shenzhen 
is an example of this. To the journalist van Luyn (2008: 28), he says:  
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Of course I don‟t want to stay in Shenzhen. Ultimately I want to go home…I love 
Longbeixiang [his home village]. That‟s where I belong. As soon as I have enough 
money, I‟ll go back. That will be in about three to five years. Then I‟ll start my own 
business…In the city there is nothing to fall back on. If a factory closes its doors here, 
you‟re on the street, but at home I always have my land. I like that certainty.  
 
Based on this discussion of the Chinese urban labor market, we can thus conclude that 
segmentation is indeed present and prominent. The rural hukou holding migrants residing and 
working in the cities and the local urban population are participating in two different 
segments of the labor market. The local urban population seems to be highly privileged over 
the migrating population. They have a wider choice of jobs available to them and are better 
paid than the migrants. The migrants, who are predominantly occupied in the informal sector, 
face temporary employment which often means low job security and instable income. Their 
rural hukou often also means that they are not well educated and thus forced to take any job 
available, despite the long hours, low wages and unsafe working conditions. The segmented 
labor market further deepens the division between the local urban population and the migrant 
workers, and makes integration even harder.  
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8. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The focus of this thesis is to illustrate the hukou system‟s effects on individual life strategies 
as well as its effects on the society at large, as a source of integration, conflict and the creator 
of differences. I wanted to illustrate how the hukou system is a policy initiated by the state 
that is used in order to closely monitor and control the movement of the population and that 
has profound effects on segregation and division in the society at large. My hypothesis is that 
the strong Chinese state has initiated the hukou system in order to control population 
movement, which also has affected the segregation between rural and urban China, and that 
these factors have significantly affected migration. The historical description of the 
development of the hukou system illustrates how it has been used – as a tool for monitoring 
population movement at first and then as an instrument for deportation of people out of the 
cities and for keeping control of social stability. Today its functions may have shifted, but are 
none the less still important. Migration, I argue, is affected by the hukou system and I have 
discovered that it particularly is the lives of the migrants in the cities and in the countryside 
that are particularly affected by the hukou system. The low income levels in the countryside, 
the segmented labor market, the lack of social services and access to education in the cities 
are the main features affected by the hukou system that, in turn, affects patterns of migration 
and individual life strategies. Here follows a summary of the chapters in this thesis, and then a 
presentation of the final conclusions that can be drawn from the presentation and analysis 
above. I conclude this thesis with suggesting some implications and new problems that I 
believe need to be researched further.  
 
8.1 Summary 
 
This thesis takes focuses on the Chinese hukou system, and especially how it affects the lives 
of the migrant workers circulating the nation today in search of employment or for other 
reasons. In the context of migration theory and migration in relation to development and state 
policy, this thesis argues that migration in highly affected by the hukou system. I have used 
the single case study in order to exemplify how a state can use a bureaucratic institution (such 
as the hukou system) in order to control population movement and, furthermore, to preserve 
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social stability. The hukou system is an important instrument for the state‟s migrant labor 
regime, in which the state maximizes the labor force provided by the migrants while not 
taking care of their wellbeing or civil rights. The hukou system is perceived of as an extreme 
case of state control over the population; a state policy that to a great extent ties people to a 
geographical location. The single case study method is advantageous since it has allowed me 
to look deeply into one case which makes it easier to distinguish patterns of causes and 
effects. The material used in this thesis is mostly academic books and articles, gathered from 
academic data bases. I have also used material from different organization, such and the 
United Nations and the human rights organization Human Rights in China. Furthermore, I 
have a few references to journalistic accounts as well as to the Chinese government‟s official 
website. I find this to be a useful mix of sources, allowing me to analyzing many sources of 
information.  
In chapter 5, internal migration in China is discussed, showing how people have started 
moving excessively since 1978. Today, an estimated 150 million people or more are living at 
different place than they are registered in, and most of them are temporary migration. I have 
shown that economic factors causes are the most important ones contributing to the decision 
to migrate. Social- and kinship networks also make many people move, since they provide the 
migrant with a sense of security. Many temporary migrants feel alienated and marginalized in 
the cities and the social networks seem to give the migrants support and comfort. Marriage 
migration can be a way for, mostly women, to marry up but, as we have seen, women holding 
rural hukou are not very attractive on the urban marriage market.  
The development of the hukou system is discussed in chapter 6. The hukou system has deep 
roots in the Chinese society, and was blown into life again after the CCP came to power. 
Today, the system regulates migration and affects many aspects of a migrant‟s life. The rural 
or urban hukou status given to each and every Chinese citizen, to a large extent affects their 
lives. Even though the function of the system has changed during the past 30 years, it is still 
important and constitutes an effective state control tool.  
The main effects of the hukou system, as described in chapter 7, are: differences in income 
levels and state investment, the access to social services, the access to education and the 
segregated labor market. I have shown how the income levels in rural areas are significantly 
lower than the urban ones and that state investment, as well as foreign investment, is 
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unequally distributed among the different areas. Concerning social services and welfare 
benefits, the migrant workers in the cities have no access to these in their current place of 
residency. Even here, the urban population is privileged over the rural population. Migrant 
children cannot even get access to education in the cities. The fees are significantly higher for 
migrants than for the local urban population and many choose to either start schools of their 
own or return back home when their children reach school age. The admission procedures for 
higher education are also discriminating towards rural hukou holders who have a harder time 
getting admitted to desired universities. The segregation of the labor market is the last effect 
of the hukou system on the Chinese society described. The jobs available to migrant workers 
are very different from the ones available to the local urban workers, and the migrants are 
usually employed in sectors with dirty, dangerous and difficult jobs.  
 
8.2 Conclusions 
 
The discriminatory nature of the hukou system has been outlined above. The unequal and 
segregated society in which the Chinese population lives today has also been demonstrated 
and the patterns of migration have been discussed. The controversial and unique feature of the 
hukou system, which makes it stand out among registration systems in other countries, is that 
it not only aims at monitoring population movement and arranging statistics, but actually is a 
tool used by the state to control migration and preserve social stability. By not letting people 
move into the cities, China has for a long time avoided the creation of urban slums visible in 
so many other big cities, especially in developing countries. However, on its quest for 
modernization and industrialization, the Chinese state has ignored the development of the 
countryside, and the segmentation between the different areas has grown bigger. By using the 
hukou system as a tool, the state made sure that the rural population stayed in the countryside 
and produced goods and supplies needed in the urban cities. This division between the rural 
and urban areas still prevails in China, and I believe it to be one of the most important 
structural factors affecting the migration taking place there today. The underdevelopment, the 
insufficient inflow of capital, the great surplus of laborers, the low wages and the general 
backwardness of the countryside stand in significant contrast to the prosperous cities which 
have benefitted the most from the reform period. The push factors of the countryside and the 
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pull factors of the cities are thus quite apparent, and today people migrate on a large scale 
despite the rigid restrictions imposed on them due to the hukou system.  
The main conclusions to be drawn from the presentation and analysis above are, first, that the 
lives of migrant workers in the city are highly affected by the hukou system and that it also 
affects how people migrate. As we have seen, the migrant workers often feel extremely 
alienated and marginalized in the cities. They are forced to take the most low-waged, dirty 
and dangerous jobs. Their rural hukou and their status as mingong (migrant worker) is a 
constant source of discriminating treatment by their fellow city dwellers and the government 
has for a long time often viewed the migrants as thieves, criminals and sources of social 
unrest. This image of the migrant population does not match the picture drawn in this thesis. 
From the picture painted by experienced scholars, we can conclude that the migrants are, on 
the contrary, well organized and most of them live law-abiding lives quite isolated from the 
local urban population. This cannot, of course, be true for all migrants and many have 
probably given in to criminality - but the one-sided perception held by the state and the local 
urban population needs to be revised. The migrants‟ rural hukou status seems to be an 
important factor contributing to the strong bonds to the native village and to their fellow 
villagers. Since all know how hard it can be to be a newcomer in the city, most migrants form 
social networks that one can turn to for help with employment and housing but also for 
company, comfort and entertainment. Many migrants trust only kin and fellow villagers 
migrating before them, to suggest a decent job and housing and hence often follow in the 
migrating tracks of these. Before moving, most migrants explore their chances of finding 
employment in the city, and weigh this with other factors such as the expected urban salaries 
and the loss of income from agriculture. This shows that most migrants have a clear plan 
when heading for the city, rather than migrating “blindly” as often portrayed by the state and 
media. In short, the alienating effects that the hukou system have on peasant migrants in the 
cities, has led to certain closeness and to networks of mutual assistance among the migrant 
workers.  
Second, the hukou system also significantly affects the migrants‟ lives in the cities in more 
ways than the purely social. Within the highly segregated labor market, as illustrated in 
chapter 5 and 7, local urban workers and migrant workers do not compete for the same jobs. 
Migrant workers are usually employed in the sectors offering 3D jobs – jobs that are difficult, 
demeaning and dangerous. The jobs as construction workers, waitresses, nannies and factory 
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workers are shunned by the local urban workers and the lack of competitiveness in the labor 
market is instead replaced by deep segmentation. Even when migrants are employed at the 
same place as local urban workers, they are usually lower paid and not treated as equals. 
Stories about cruel employers, harsh working conditions and substandard housing facilities 
attest to additional consequences that the migrant workers have to face. The conditions they 
work in are, hence, not the best to say the least, and yet many of the migrant workers earn 
substantially more than they would back home. Many of them send home remittances or bring 
the money with them to their families when they return home for Spring Festival. The state 
obviously benefit from this arrangement of temporary migration. By taking advantage of the 
never-ending source of labor force that the countryside provides, the state can offer cheap 
labor to the industries that want to place their unit of production in urban China. By using the 
policies of the hukou system, the state also makes sure that the migrants do not stay too long 
in the cities and that they return home every now and then without troubling or burdening the 
state‟s resources too much. As long as the countryside is poor and underdeveloped, the people 
there will have no choice but to take the jobs available to them in the cities. This migrant 
labor regime extracts as much labor as possible from the migrant workers while not taking 
care of their economic, social or work-related security. The segmented labor market is one of 
the most visible effects of the hukou system in the Chinese cities, and illustrates the 
discriminatory strategies set out by the migrant labor regime. 
Furthermore, since the citizens‟ rights to social services and welfare benefits are tied to their 
location of registration, the migrants living at a different place than the one they are registered 
in face hard times were they become sick, unemployed or simply old. Medical insurance, 
unemployment insurance and pension are all unavailable to the migrant workers in their 
present place of residency. But the migrants are not the only rural hukou holders lacking these 
services. As we can see in the chart in chapter 7, the social services and benefits are unequally 
distributed among the population. The state has clearly privileged the urban part of the 
population when it comes to this. While the insurances and old age pension system are fairly 
well established in the cities, the rural population has almost no access to these at all. 
Migrants are overlooked and disregarded and receive none of the above in their new place of 
residency. Not even those who have stayed in the cities for several years have access to 
medical insurance, unemployment insurance and old-age pension. This complete disregard for 
the interest and welfare of the migrant workers and the rural population is naturally an 
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obstacle to the development of the countryside. People need a security net of social services in 
order to feel safe enough to stay in the villages and encouraged enough to be willing to begin 
developing the area. In order to make the migrant workers equal to the local urban population, 
these benefits need to be available to them as well and individuals‟ hukou status should no 
longer be the factor determining the access to welfare benefits.  
Education in China is relatively equally distributed among the cities and the countryside, and 
has resulted in a high percentage of the population able to read and write. The migrants, 
however, are discriminated is this area as well. As described above, migrants have to pay 
significantly bigger fees in order to enroll their children in a regular urban school. Most 
migrants obviously cannot afford these fees, and many return home to their native villages 
when their children reach school-age. Migrant schools in the cities have a hard time finding 
qualified staff and the facilities they reside in are poor. The result is, one presumes, that these 
migrant children receive inferior education compared to the local urban children which surely 
has significant effects on the educational stratification in society and across social classes. On 
the other hand, the foundation of urban migrant schools, as well as the establishment of 
migrant villages, markets, restaurants etc, demonstrates the organizational skills and 
determination among migrants to create a decent life for themselves and their families in the 
cities. Within time these communities might have grown stronger and the quality of education 
might be improved by employing well educated staff. The best alternative would, of course, 
be that migrant children could go to the same schools as the local urban children. This would 
probably increase integration between the two groups significantly.  
So what about the future? Will the system keep going forever or will it eventually be 
abolished? And what about the situation of the migrants? As far as the abolition of the hukou 
system, it does not seem to happen in the foreseeable future. Plans to replace the dualistic 
registration system with a unified system has not been implemented (Fan 2008: 52) and even 
though Chinese media constantly report how the government intend to change the system and 
improve the migrants‟ situation nothing really happens. The long history of the system and the 
legitimacy given to it by the strong Chinese state provides it with a solid base and before there 
is an alternative that the CCP feel comfortable with, I doubt they will abolish the hukou 
system. The migrants and the rest of the rural hukou holders are still highly discriminated 
within the hukou system. And even though they seem organized in their migration, as I have 
described above, they are not organized enough to have formed any trade unions or similar 
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organizations to protect their own interests. However, recently they have been given 
increasing attention in domestic and international media, and organizations such as the UN 
and independent human rights organization work for drawing attention to their situation. 
Thus, the situation for China‟s temporary migrant workers might improve somewhat in the 
future, but this of course requires a stronger commitment from the national leaders and a lot of 
work on the rights of workers in general. If differences between the social classes are to be 
decreased and if people are to feel more equal, they need to be equal in the eyes of the state 
first. I think that the abolition or diminution of the hukou system could contribute a great deal 
to the integration of the different geographical and socioeconomic parts of the nation. 
 
8.3 Implications 
 
We have seen that the state in this socialist transitional economy plays a significant role and 
has managed to keep tight control over population movement, the economy and the 
development. The hukou system is perhaps the most important instrument the state has used 
in order to control these matters. The effects of the hukou system listed above are deep and 
profound. The majority of the Chinese people, particularly the rural population and the 
migrants, are affected by the system and the state keeps close control of their whereabouts. I 
believe that the implications generated by this study mainly concern the state and questions 
regarding the migrant labor regime. That the state is using the hukou system to control 
population movement is quite clear and I find it important to study this matter further. The 
state‟s perception of the migrant workers as a source of labor and its own responsibility 
towards them should be investigated further. At this point I do not find the existing material to 
be enough. The state‟s relation with development is another aspect that needs to be studied 
further. One problem with this is, of course, that it is hard to get access to the relevant 
information such as official documents and state plans. That the state has a migrant labor 
regime is a perspective that I find to be highly interesting, and this should be analyzed on a 
deeper level, and put in relation to development and patterns of migration. Within migration 
theory, the role of the state should also be given more attention. In order to find relevant 
relations of causes and effects, the role of the state needs to be theorized.  
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The subject of hukou has been quite well researched and Chinese internal migration even 
more so. There is a great deal of literature on the patterns of movement that migrants follow, 
how they decide to move, their discriminatory social roles in the cities, return migration and 
the impact migration has on the countryside (for instance Fan 2008, Zhang 2001, Solinger 
1999). Likewise, there are a number of books and articles that explore the historical 
development of the hukou system and its discriminating nature (for instance Wang 2005, 
Chan and Zhang 1999, Cheng and Selden 1994). The two subjects are often combined since 
the hukou system and the migrant workers are so intertwined. The negative effects of the 
hukou system are most experienced by the rural and migrating population, and they are the 
ones that should tell the academic world about their experiences. It would be interesting to see 
the stories of the migrants and the rural population described more in-depth in academic 
material. In my view, there is an apparent need for more anthropological work in this field. 
Long-term fieldwork, with interviews and participant observation has been done, but the 
books written are mostly journalistic in their character (for instance van Luyn 2006 and Wong 
2008), and I think that there is a call for this kind of research within the academic world as 
well. Particularly I believe there is a need for in-depth interviews investigating migrants‟ 
experiences of the structure, effects and obstacles of the hukou system. This would give the 
migrant workers described in this thesis a face and a voice and this is indeed very important. 
Comparative case studies would be interesting too, I am particularly interested in a 
comparison between the effects of the Chinese hukou system and the Indian cast system, but 
of course there are other comparable systems that would serve as interesting cases as well.  
Academics also should continue to study the future of the hukou system, since it will play a 
role in the general development of the whole nation – in terms of politics, civil rights and 
economy. One important aspect to investigate further is how the people of China resist the 
system and if there are any forms of organized groups that actively protest and struggle for the 
rights of migrants and the rural population. Resistance in China in general is an interesting 
subject, with the strong state that has forbidden organizations such as the Falungong and that 
actively tries to repress all types of political opposition. It has been 20 years since the 
demonstrations at Tiananmen in Beijing and the massacre that followed. In this light, it would 
be highly interesting to see how people protest today and what tools they have at their 
disposal. The rural population has not shown any signs of organizing and protesting against 
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the hukou system, but this subject needs to be further researched in order to be able to say 
anything about the future of the system. 
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